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Market power issues 
in the reformed Russian electricity supply industry 
Nadia Chernenko 
October 2013 
Abstract . The paper examines long-run and short-run levels of market power in the 
liberalised Russian electricity market. We observe that despite potential for market 
power abuse, actual exercise of market power as measured by price-cost mark-ups 
remained low. We attribute the result to the bid-at-cost rule implemented as a part of a 
special unit commitment procedure on the day-ahead market. We first look at the 
restructured industry and discuss the mergers and acquisitions and their impact on 
competition in long term. The M&A were undertaken in different market zones and thus 
did not seem to increase concentration (HHI remains almost unchanged) although with 
future zone integration competition in long run is put at risk. We then examine short-run 
level of market power by estimating hourly price-cost mark-ups and assessing their 
dynamics in 2010 and 2011, a year preceding and following the market liberalisation 
respectively. Using time series models (AR models) we reject hypothesis of actual 
market power abuse. Further, using a Tobit regression we find that the liberalisation 
decreased the mark-ups by about 1.66 percentage points.  
1. Introduction
In many electricity markets around the world, restructuring and liberalisation led to higher 
market power (as measured by the price-cost mark-up).
1
 By contrast, we argue that in Russia
a similar electricity market reform conducted in 2003-11 did not translate into higher price-
cost mark-ups. This is especially surprising given a merger wave that followed soon after the 
industry restructuring and historically low volumes of contracting in the electricity markets. In 
this paper, we investigate the dynamics of market power in the post-reform Russian electricity 
market and discuss how the Russian government handled the issues of competition and 
potential market power abuse. We observe that the actual exercise of market power has been 
quite low and attribute the result to the bid-at-cost rules enforced via a special unit 
commitment procedure on the day-ahead market. 
The Russian electricity industry reform consisted essentially of two components. The first 
component was divesture of the vertically integrated monopoly into generation and 
transmission companies and was largely completed in mid-2008. Further wave of mergers 
1
 Most notable examples are England and Wales early 1990s (Wolfram 1999) and the California electricity crisis 
(Borenstein et al. 2002). 
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among the generators narrowed down the pool of owners in the industry, which suggests 
stronger potential for market power and higher price-cost mark-ups. The second component 
was market liberalisation with the removal of regulated contracts and tariffs and was finished 
by January 2011.  Regulated contracts were by nature vesting contracts; their removal from 
the market meant lower contract cover, stronger incentives to exercise market power and 
higher mark-ups. In order to prevent price manipulations in the liberalised market, the 
government imposed the bid-at-cost rule on the generators requiring them to bid all available 
capacity at variable production cost
2
. 
On the Russian electricity market, the bid-at-cost rule is a part of the unit commitment 
procedure and the day-ahead trading. The unit commitment (UC) procedure is run by the 
System Operator on Friday; for Saturday until following Friday inclusive. The generators 
submit the start-up cost and price-quantity bids for all available capacity for the whole week. 
The procedure determines only the start/stop time of the generation equipment for the 
following week, not the output schedule. The UC price-quantity bids are used on the day-
ahead (DA) market as self-enforcing price caps. On the DA market the generator may submit 
new bid (which would determine the actual hourly production) but the DA bids cannot exceed 
the UC bids. If a generator submits high UC bids he risks being idle for the next week, and if 
he submits high DA bids he will be capped with his own UC bids. The Federal Antimonopoly 
Service of Russia monitors the bidding behaviour and may inflict fines on companies 
suspected of manipulating the bids (as was already the case with several companies). 
International research suggests that in liberalised markets private generators use capacity 
withholding as a typical strategy to exercise market power.
3
 A large producer with several 
power plants would withhold some capacity so that a more expensive power plant comes into 
operation (that otherwise would remain idle) and determines a higher price on the market. The 
actual level of market power is measured by the price-cost mark-up, where price is usually a 
system marginal price and cost is the system marginal cost of generation. Since capacity 
withholding leads to higher mark-ups (the change in mark-ups depending of the slope of the 
supply curve), detecting excessive mark-ups becomes a tool to identify market power.
4
 
Theoretical results by Allaz and Vila (1993) show that contracting can drive price-cost mark-
                                                          
2
 The rule to bid all available capacity is stipulated in Regulation 5 of the Market. Fixed cost of production is 
recovered separately on the capacity market. 
3
 Bower et al. (2001) – the German market; Borenstein et al. (2002) – the Californian market; Buhn and Oliveira 
(2003) – the England and Wales market. 
4
 Of course, one should exclude other reasonable explanations for insufficient capacity supply and the resulting 
high mark-ups; for example, extreme weather conditions (hence excessively high demand), a transmission line 
failure or other major technical accident, amongst other factors. 
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up down to zero. A regulatory requirement to bid at marginal cost may be another tool to keep 
mark-ups low (such a requirement exists, for example, on the Irish electricity market).  
In Russia, where pre-reform regulated tariffs on electricity were kept artificially low, mark-
ups would naturally be negative. Market liberalisation should lead to price rises, ideally up to 
the level of generation cost, and mark-ups would increase from negative values to zero. In 
other words, this increase in mark-ups that follows liberalisation does not immediately signal 
market power abuse. Rather, an increase beyond zero (or some other threshold level) would 
testify against market participants suspected of market power abuse. 
Geographically, the Russian electricity market consists of 28 free flow zones defined by the 
major transmission lines so the market is quite fragmented. Within the zones trade is 
unrestricted while interzonal trade is subject to transmission constraints. The (already 
mentioned) post-reform merger wave concerned the companies located in different zones so 
at first glance the mergers did not affect the local level of concentration (though the situation 
might change when some smaller zones are incorporated with each other in the next few 
years). Bilateral contracts on the market have never been popular, constituting only 5-10% of 
the traded volume.
5
 In a situation where contracts are not widespread, the requirement to bid 
all capacity at production cost was introduced on the Russian electricity market in order to 
curb market power and keep the mark-ups at a low level. 
The Russian electricity supply industry went through a large restructuring reform in 2003-
2011. The reform consisted essentially of two parts: restructuring the incumbent monopoly 
called RAO EES and redesigning the electricity market. The monopoly was separated into 
many generation companies, grid companies and the system operator. The new market trading 
rules introduced the commercial operator as well as free pricing and contracting, so that tariff 
regulation was eventually abandoned. The transition to free pricing started in January 2007 
and took four years to complete. From January 2011, wholesale markets have been liberalised.  
In parallel to these two aspects of the reform, our paper focuses on two main issues of market 
power: concentration and mark-ups. Analysis of concentration provides insight on long-term 
perspectives of market power, whereas dynamics of mark-ups illuminate the short-term 
perspective. 
Two papers have already examined concentration on the Russian electricity market by 
computing the zonal HHI, which turned out to be relatively high. Pittman (2007) used the 
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 Author’s estimate based on hourly data from the ATS, Commercial Operator of the Russian Electricity Market.  
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industry structure and market zoning proposed at the start of the reform to compute the HHI 
index, while Gore et al. (2012) compute the index using the actual free flow zones. Neither of 
the papers accounted for transmission flows between the zones which can be quite significant 
as compared to intra-zone production. As a part of our study, we re-estimate the HHI given 
the final industry structure, ownership and import flows into FFZ. We find that concentration 
is severe in some parts of the country, whereas it is quite low in others. Mergers and 
acquisitions seem to have little impact on HHI as the merging companies were located in the 
different zones. The imports into some FFZ act as a significant ‘competitor’ to producers 
inside the zone and hence the overall situation with concentration appears less severe. We 
observe that reducing the number of zones and alleviating transmission constraints (and 
unlocking small zones) could significantly improve competition in the smallest zones of the 
market. 
During the transition period to the free market, the government maintained electricity tariffs at 
a low level, and did not increase them to match production costs. In such a case, it is natural 
to expect an increase in prices and mark-ups once the regulation is removed; the size of 
increase depending on the discrepancy between the tariffs and the actual generation cost. 
Furthermore, regulated contracts represent a type of vesting contracts used in other countries 
to curb market power. Removing compulsory contracting creates stronger temptation to 
manipulate spot prices and, as such, could lead to higher mark-ups.  
In our paper we estimate price-cost mark-ups in the Russian electricity industry during 2010 
and 2011, namely a year preceding and following the market liberalisation on January 1, 2011. 
The mark-ups appear to be low and stable which contradicts the hypotheses of stronger 
market power due to concentration or removal of contracts. We also use a Tobit regression to 
quantify the impact of the regulated contracts and other counterfactuals on the mark-up 
dynamics. Our main finding is somewhat surprising: removing price regulation decreased the 
mark-up by about 1.66 percentage points. We attribute the seeming discrepancy to the bit-at-
cost rule implemented in the unit commitment procedure and in the day-ahead trading.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents a brief historical overview of 
the Russian ESI; section 3 discusses theoretical measures of market power; section 4 focuses 
on ownership and concentration in the Russian market; section 5 deals with mark-up 
measures such as the Lerner index, the contracts and the impact of the liberalisation on the 
Lerner index dynamics.; section 6discuss the results and section 7 is the conclusion. 
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2. Russian electricity supply industry – historical overview 6 
This section reviews briefly the main features of the pre- and post-reform industry, with a 
focus on market design, concentration and pricing affecting market power. The pre-reform 
industry was essentially a vertically integrated monopoly, under heavy price regulation, but 
endowed with dispatch function which the monopoly abused to exercise market power and 
earn excessive profits. The post-reform market has problems with market power that are more 
similar to those in other developed and reformed electricity industries. 
The Russian electricity supply industry in the early 1990s preserved many features of the 
planned system. The Soviet electricity industry consisted of 72 regional administrations called 
energos, each responsible for generation, distribution and supply in a given area. Total 
industry capacity in 1992 was 213 GW (Russian Statistics Service). At an early stage of the 
reforms, the federal government transferred the bulk of generation assets under the ownership 
of the newly created a holding company called RAO EES. The process of corporatisation was 
not smooth, since many regional authorities disputed control and ownership of the assets. The 
final property structure thus reflected the individual trade-off and compromise between the 
federal and regional governments.  By 1996 RAO EES owned, controlled or managed nearly 
168 GW out of 213.
7
 Some of the regional generation companies managed to defend their 
independent status: together they owned 26 GW. Nuclear power stations (21 GW) were 
managed separately under the umbrella of the state agency for nuclear generation. 
The subsidiary companies of RAO EES and independent producers were still responsible for 
electricity supplies in their areas. To manage imbalances in local supply and demand, the 
government created a federal market for electricity and capacity (called FOREM) and 
assigned the role of market and dispatch operator to RAO EES. This inevitably led to 
inefficiency and a conflict of interest, because RAO EES was interested in dispatching its own 
power plants first, that were relatively expensive to run (e.g. thermal power plants), rather 
than power plants of the independent producers with low variable cost (e.g. hydropower 
generation). 
The financial situation in the industry was quite poor. First, the general economic situation 
was not favourable to the industry: the economy was declining and so was the demand for 
                                                          
6
 This section is largely based on IEA report (1993, 1995) and the book by Xu (2004). See Opitz (2000) for an 
interim review; Kennedy (2003) and Tompson (2004) for a brief summary of the reform; Solanko (2011), Gore 
et al. (2012) and Chernenko (2013) for a more detailed discussion of the reform. 
7
 RAO EES (1996) annual report. Total industry capacity increased by only 3 GW from 1992 to 1996. 
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electricity. Annual consumption dropped by 23%, from 1068 TWh in 1991 to 826 TWh in 
1998; however, power plants were hardly ever shut down and the reserve margin was growing. 
Probably the main reason is that almost half of thermal station stations are combined heat and 
power plants (CHP), which produce heat for local residential customers and cannot be 
mothballed completely.  
Second, for political and social reasons, the government maintained price regulation in the 
electricity industry. Low household tariffs were subsidised at the cost of higher tariffs for 
industry customers (see IEA reports 1993, 1995). The problem of cross-subsidy appears 
extremely sensitive as it was not resolved during the last reform: with the liberalised 
wholesale prices, the low household tariffs are now cross-subsidised through higher 
distribution tariffs for industrial customers.
8
 Finally, the problem of low tariffs was 
aggravated by non-payment problems: in 1997 RAO EES collected as little as 6-7% of the 
electricity bill in cash,
 9
 the rest being paid in form of promissory notes, offsets and barter (a 
typical problem for post-soviet countries; see Krishnaswamy, 1999). Combined together, low 
demand, low tariffs and non-payment problem translated into constant financial losses in the 
industry. 
The scenario of economic recession and a high reserve margin, combined with government 
policy of low tariffs, resembles the experience of other developing countries not only in the 
former Soviet Union but also in Latin America, such as Argentina or Colombia.
10
 In Russia, 
the 1998 financial crisis reversed the economic situation from deep depression to recovery 
and subsequent growth, however the problem of low tariffs was only partially resolved during 
the liberalisation reform in 2000s. 
In terms of market power, the industry structure that emerged by the mid-1990s seems quite 
peculiar. The dominant monopoly could not manipulate tariffs, yet it had an opportunity to 
manipulate dispatch schedules, thereby ensuring positive profits (or smaller losses) for itself 
and its subsidiaries. The Russian case seems to be atypical as other electricity markets and 
jurisdictions have (or had) a single vertically integrated monopoly or at least an independent 
system operator. 
General dissatisfaction with poor industry performance, coupled with the economic revival in 
the late 1990s, provided the background for industry reform. After heated discussions, in 2001 
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 The distribution charges for industrial customers are modified through the so called last-mile contract; see 
Chernenko (2013), section 6.3 for more details. 
9
 Source of figure: Xu (2004), page 309. 
10
 Dyner et al. (2007). 
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the government adopted a programme of complete restructuring of the monopoly and of 
establishing competitive markets (rather than minor modifications of the monopoly or market 
design). During 2003-2006 the monopoly and its dependent energos were re-grouped into 21 
generation companies.
11
 The transmission division was singled out as the Federal Grid 
Company FSK, and the distribution divisions formed a company called Holding MRSK. The 
dispatch division became an independent System Operator, while the Commercial Operator 
was created from scratch. The independent power producers were also required to separate 
generation and distribution, and create independent companies. 
For the purpose of market operation, the country was divided into two pricing areas, ‘Europe’ 
and ‘Siberia’, and was further subdivided into free flow zones (FFZ).12 The FFZs are defined 
on the basis of major transmission constraints (i.e. the zones were defined ex ante to the 
market dynamics, price differentials, etc.) There are six FFZ in the ‘Siberia’ price area and 22 
in the ‘Europe’ price area.13 The electricity market is based on nodal pricing, whereas the 
capacity market relies on zonal pricing. In both markets trading between FFZs is restricted 
due to transmission constraints. Market zoning and composition of the new generation 
companies (i.e. size and location of their power plant) and translates into uneven 
concentration level across the country and the potential for market power abuse. 
There are currently two types of companies: wholesale and territorial. A wholesale generation 
company, WGC, has large power plants that are dispersed across the country, so as to avoid 
concentration of assets in a small area. There are eight WGCs, two of them under direct state 
ownership. One company became the owner of all nuclear power plants (23 GW in total); the 
other one received all major hydropower plants in the industry (24.5 GW). The six remaining 
companies, each between 8.3-9.2 GW, have large thermal power plants only. A territorial 
company, TGC, has small power plants, CHP and sometimes small hydropower stations; it is 
located within few administrative regions. Initially there were 14 territorial companies (some 
of them later split up into smaller entities): their size varied greatly from just 600 MW up to 
12,880 MW.
14
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 Six wholesale companies, 14 territorial companies and one hydropower company (details in the main text). 
Nuclear generation was, and remained, under separate state control. 
12
 There are two non-pricing areas: one at the north of the European part of the country; the other one at the Far 
East. Both remain under government regulation. Together they account only for 5% of the capacity and total 
demand (author’s estimate) and their operation hardly interfere with that of the main markets. 
13
 In 2013, and subsequently in 2014, some small FFZ are integrated with their larger neighbours, the total 
number of zones in the ‘Europe’ price area is reduced from 22 to 18. 
14
 The size of the industry increased from 213 GW in 1992 to 225 GW in 2005 (Russian Statistics Service). The 
bulk of capacity is in the price zones; the non-price areas account only for 5% of the total figure. 
8 
 
The privatisation of the generation companies aimed at creating a pool of competitive 
investors. The process was largely complete by the end of 2006. However, the final ownership 
structure appears quite concentrated given the small number of Russian holding companies, in 
particular Gazprom the gas monopoly, and a small number of foreign investors among the 
owners. Further mergers and acquisitions that inevitably followed in the industry threatened 
competition in the market and challenged the basic principles of the reform. 
The new wholesale market for electricity and capacity, NOREM (based on free bidding and 
free contracting) began operating in 2006. From January 2007 the government reduced 
gradually the volume of electricity to be sold under the tariffs (equivalently, under regulated 
contracts).
15
 Since January 2011 the wholesale markets have been liberalised (with bidding 
rules in place), and the government restricts tariff regulation to prices for households. There 
was general agreement that the tariffs were too low to cover production costs, so after the 
transition period the prices were expected to increase in order to align with cost. 
The main element of the liberalisation was a regulated contract that stipulated both the 
amount and the price (tariff) of electricity for sale or purchase. The regulated contracts 
resembled the vesting contracts used in other countries such as England & Wales to smooth 
transition from the regulated industry to a free market. As for the free bilateral contracts on 
the Russian liberalised market, these do not appear to be popular, in 2011 their gross share in 
the traded volume was only 5% (and the figure did not change much in 2012).
16
 Theory 
predicts that in such cases market players have stronger incentives to exercise market power 
as their sales and revenue are directly linked to spot prices.
17
 (The issue of contracts is 
discussed in greater detail in Section 5 on contracts and mark-ups). 
A special feature of the market design is a general requirement for generators to bid at full 
production cost.
18
 The generator should include the relevant variable cost of production, in 
particular fuel expenses. Fixed cost (such as maintenance expenses, capital cost, etc.) is 
recovered on the capacity market. A similar requirement of bidding at short-run marginal cost 
exists, e.g., on the Irish Electricity Market where the cost includes among others items the 
start-up and no-load cost.
 19
 In Russia, start-up cost is taken into account during the weekly 
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 Government Decree N 205 issued on 07.04.2007. 
16
 Source of figures: author’s estimate based on data from the Commercial Operator ATS. 
17
 Allaz and Vila (1993), although others dispute the results, see Murphy and Smeers (2010). 
18
 See Government Decree N 1172 issued on 27.12.2010, “On the Rules of the Wholesale Markets for Electricity 
and Capacity”, Article 18 of the Rules. 
19
Bidding Code of Practice (2007), Single Electricity Market Operator (Ireland), available at  
[www.allislandproject.org/GetAttachment.aspx?id=6ce5b381-927e-4e4f-8642-341d53985720] 
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unit commitment procedure while main bidding takes place on the day-ahead market. The 
bidding behaviour is monitored by the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service who had already 
issued decisions and inflicted fines on TGC-11 in 2008, MosEnergo (former TGC-3) in 2009 
and BiyskEnergo (a small IPP) in 2010. 
To summarise, the post-reform electricity market in Russia is likely to suffer from 
concentration and regional or local market power, as was the case of other post-reform 
countries. Gradual market liberalisation of 2007-11 in Russia removed regulated contracts 
without imposing compulsory contracting (e.g. at free prices) hence the incentives to exercise 
market power were amplified, however the bid-at-cost rule is supposed to mitigate the 
problem. Further part of this paper discusses various measures of market power, then 
estimates the concentration level in the Russian electricity industry and test the hypothesis of 
actual market power abuse. 
3. Market power – theoretical measures  
Market power is defined as the ability to alter prices profitably away from the competitive 
level
20
. Study of market power, or indeed any issue of competition, requires definition of the 
market in terms of product and geography. In case of electricity, the need to constantly 
balance supply and demand adds time dimension to this definition. Electricity is a standard 
product, subject to voltage, frequency and other technical requirements. As for geography and 
time, these must be examined jointly. First, almost any electricity market exports and imports 
energy, so mere geographical or administrative bounds are not sufficient to define a full set of 
suppliers and consumers. Second, as demand varies during the day and throughout the year, 
some transmission lines might be congested and some areas might become isolated (even for 
a few hours a year). Consequently, a geographical market might expand or “shrink” according 
to demand fluctuations.  
Traditionally, antitrust regulatory authorities have relied on concentration measures to 
evaluate competition in the industry, for example, the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index. 
Specific features of electricity market require more sophisticated measures, of which we will 
discuss the Residual supply index (RSI), together with the Transmission-constraint RSI, and 
the Lerner index. We also discuss the role of contracts in mitigating market power. 
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The definition is standard and can be found, e.g. in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), page 383, or Stoft (2002), page 
316. 
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The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is a concentration measure used by many competition and 
anti-monopoly authorities to examine the potential for market power in the industry. HHI is 
computed as the sum of squared percentage shares ( 2( )jjHHI s where js  is the 
percentage share in total output) and ranges from 0 to 10,000. According to the US 
Department of Justice, a market with HHI below 1,500 is not concentrated, a market with 
HHI between 1,500 and 2,500 is moderately concentrated and a market with HHI above 2,500 
is highly concentrated
21
. On the electricity markets HHI is usually based on installed capacity 
(accounting, if necessary for export and import capacity), but for several reasons discussed 
below it is a poor indicator of market power. 
In the electricity industry, market power can be exercised either by physical capacity 
withholding or by bidding above competitive prices. Any generator in principle may attempt 
to withhold capacity, whereas a marginal generator (i.e. one that is the last to be used to meet 
the demand and whose bid determines the equilibrium price) also has incentives to attempt to 
raise the price. Either behaviour leads to an upward shift in the supply curve and to the 
distortion of the equilibrium price and output: the price is increased and the output is 
decreased.
 22
    
Full information on plants’ thermal efficiency and fuel prices would make bidding above 
marginal cost very unlikely, as such behaviour can be easily detected. Moreover, historical 
information on outages makes capacity withholding less probable. From a practical 
perspective, a recently liberalised market typically has a comprehensive data set on plants’ 
efficiency in the public domain, inherited from the pre-reform utility company. As the market 
develops, information on outages is accrued, e.g. by the Independent System Operator and/or 
the regulatory authority, who are then able to monitor the generators for market power abuse. 
Standard IO models do not distinguish between potential for and actual exercise of market 
power (e.g. a standard monopoly is assumed to exercise market power by default).
23
 In 
electricity markets this distinction is important, since demand varies during the day and short-
run demand is known to be inelastic.
 24
 There is little significance in exercising market power 
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 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010) “Horizontal Merger Guidelines”, § 5.2. 
22
 See Stoft (2002), page 320, figure 4-1.1, and the related discussion of quantity withholding, quantity and price 
distortion 
23
 By definition, exercising market power in market is assumed to be always profitable and a rational firm is 
expected to exercise market power if there is an opportunity to do so (e.g. a monopoly would always raise its 
price above the competitive level). 
24
 See, for example, paper by Borenstein et al. (1999) on the suitability of concentration measures for the 
competition analysis of the electricity industry. 
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when the demand is low or, in other words, when there is enough spare capacity. A marginal 
generator that attempts to withhold capacity or bid above the competitive price is very likely 
to be replaced on the market by another (idle) producer. By contrast, market power abuse is 
more probable when demand is peaking (i.e. when there is little spare capacity and demand 
does not respond much to price changes). In such circumstances the marginal producer might 
find it profitable to reduce output, perhaps by a small amount, to induce a large price spike 
and enjoy excessive profits. 
Since it is actual production, not installed capacity that matters, HHI based on capacity is a 
poor indicator of market power (although it can indicate long-run positions of the producers 
on the market). A relatively small independent producer might be marginal on the market and 
hence enjoy considerable market power during peak periods. To assess the importance of any 
supplier should it become marginal, or pivotal, the California’s ISO (CAISO) developed the 
Residual Supply Index. The RSI is computed as follows, for each hour in the year (Sheffrin, 
2002): 
Total Supply - Largest Seller's Supply
Total Demand
RSI   
The RSI screen test states that the index should be more than 110% for more than 95% of the 
hours is a year. Sheffrin observes the RSI exhibits strong correlation with the Lerner index 
and thus can serve as a good proxy for actual market power, without the need to estimate 
production costs, equilibrium prices and mark-ups. Swinand et al (2008) provide a theoretical 
model based on firm’s residual demand that links together firm’s individual mark-up, RSI and 
absolute demand elasticity:
25
 
1i iP MC RSI
P 
 
 . 
Individual price-cost mark-up is inversely and linearly correlated with RSI. Moreover the 
intercept and the slope are equal in absolute terms so that the relationship can be easily 
verified empirically. 
The RSI was developed for a single-zone market without major transmission constraints. Lee 
et al. (2011) pointed out that the index is not suitable for a market which uses locational 
marginal prices and wherein many lines are congested for a significant number of hours. They 
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 See the Appendix 1.Model 3C for details. 
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offered a transmission-constrained RSI (TCRSI) which is computed for each a generation 
company as 
FR using a simple linear programming model:
26
 
,
max F
q t
R
        (2.3)
 
s.t. 
,
, ,k ki ji s i
k k j
q x R D k i    
      (2.4)
 
, ,k k ki ij iq x K k i          
(2.5)
 
, { }kij ij
k
x T ij 
       (2.6) 
0,s si ijq x s F           
(2.7)
 
where FR – transmission-constrained RSI for firm F,  
s – index of the generating unit for which TCRSI is computed, 
{1,...,28}i  – index for free flow zones, 
{1,...,139}k  – index for a generation unit, continuous numbering, 
k
iq – output of unit k  located in zone i  for in-zone consumers, 
k
jix – output of unit k  located in zone i for export to zone j , 
iD – demand in zone i , 
k
iK – installed capacity of unit k  located in zone i , 
ijT – transmission constraint from zone i  to zone j , Note that ij jiT T   as the actual 
network topology may results in different limits on the aggregate flows from i to j  
and from j to i . 
s F  – all generation units s that belong to firm F for which TCRSI is computed, 
The TCRSI is estimated for the hour of peak demand only; consequently it is more suitable to 
evaluate market power in the long run. By contrast, computing the index for all hours in a 
year would provide insight into short-term power abuse and indicate which congested lines 
require reinforcement or an increase of their transmission capacity in the first place. 
The Lerner index is initially developed for the case of the monopoly (see Appendix 1. 
Model 3A for a formal model). The index is written as ( ) /LI P MC P   where P is the 
market price and MC is marginal cost. In case of the monopoly the index is inversely 
proportional to the absolute elasticity of market demand: 1/LI  . When the demand is 
inelastic, the monopoly has stronger incentives to raise the price without losing too many 
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 The model is also replicated in Appendix 1. Model 1. 
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customers and hence it would gain extra profits. The model is then extended to Cournot 
oligopoly (Model 3B) to derive firm-specific and industry-average Lerner indices which are 
also inversely proportional to demand elasticity. In addition, the firm’s index is proportional 
to the firm’s share of the market, /i iLI s   , and the industry index is proportional to the 
concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, /LI HHI  . 
As discussed above, when electricity demand is low, generators have little incentive to 
manipulate capacity; hence observed prices are expected to be close to marginal cost. When 
demand is high and supply of capacity is tight, prices may increase due to demand-rationing 
rules (absent price caps on the market) or due to market power abuse. The curve of observed 
prices would be steeper than the supply curve, and the mark-up curve would be increasing 
(figure 1, left pane). In an electricity market with must-run generation (that has zero-price 
bids) the left part of the supply curve is zero, so the mark-up curve would start at one and then 
return to a normal increasing curve (figure 1, right pane). 
 
Figure 1. Mark-up dynamics on electricity markets without and with must-run generation. 
Examining the Lerner index indicates that there are essentially two ways to reduce market 
power: by increasing demand elasticity or by reducing individual share in total output. The 
first option is not feasible in the electricity market, since most consumers, particularly 
households, do not have an opportunity to respond to real-time prices. The second option 
might imply stronger competition (e.g. through reallocating more evenly the output among the 
existing producers or through new entry). Either option is costly because it requires 
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construction of new capacity by fringe or new producers and does not help mitigate market 
power in the immediate future. However, reducing firm’s sales in a spot market, through 
forward contracts, reduces firm’s incentive to manipulate the spot price. Consequently, 
forward contracting becomes another way to mitigate market power, without altering the 
number of competitors or the total demand.  
Allaz and Vila (1993) presented a theoretical framework of a duopoly with linear demand, 
constant marginal cost and forward contracting. They showed that when the number of 
forward trading periods tends to infinity (or equivalently, when trading becomes more 
frequent), competitors sell forward in the first period and attempt to contract the residual 
demand in the future periods (to beat each other) so that the uncontracted demand eventually 
vanishes to zero. The incentives to increase the spot price above marginal cost disappear, 
hence the duopoly prices and output tend towards those in perfect competition. Other papers 
modified the model under consideration, such as the supply-function framework (Green, 1999) 
or Bertrand competition (Mahenc and Salanie, 2004). Bushnell (2007) extended the model to 
oligopolies with increasing marginal costs and calibrated the results to several US markets. 
He concluded that, under certain conditions, forward contracting is equivalent to increasing 
the number of suppliers from n to n
2
, or in other words, to introducing stronger competition 
With large volume of forward contracts, the generator has lower incentives to manipulate the 
spot price as it only affects the uncontracted demand. It can be shown that both the RSI and 
mark-ups are also smaller. In a situation where a generator is over-contracted (i.e. has to sell 
more energy under forward contracts than it is willing to produce given its current cost 
structure), it acts as a buyer on the spot market and is more interested in lower spot prices. 
Hence, the incentives for manipulating the spot price are reduced greatly, if not removed 
completely. 
In summary, to detect market power abuse in the electricity market, one should use measures 
based on uncontracted output and cost rather than on installed capacity. Estimating the 
Residual Supply Index and Lerner Index is preferred, although HHI can be used for analysing 
long-run perspectives on the market. Since demand is very inelastic in short-run and 
construction of new power plants and lines requires a long time, forward contracting is an 
instruments that can be immediately enforced in the market by the regulatory authorities to 
mitigate market power.  
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4. Ownership and concentration in the Russian ESI 
The privatisation of the RAO EES power plants aimed at attracting private investors to the 
industry. A variety of private shareholder would guarantee, at least ex ante, competition 
between producers. However, the final number of owners turned out to be quite limited. The 
ownership of the major generation companies in the industry at the end of the unbundling 
process and three years later is given in table 1. 
Despite efforts to privatise the new generation companies, the federal government appeared 
among the main stakeholders. The state-owned Gazprom and its subsidiaries secured control 
in four generation companies with total capacity of 36 GW. The private Russian holding IES, 
Integrated Energy Systems, acquired shares in another four companies (15 GW in total), and 
the Siberian coal-mining holding SUEK bought TGC-12 and 13 (7 GW in total).   Other 
generation companies each have a separate owner, either a Russian or a foreign investor 
predominantly from the energy industry. In particular, E.On (Germany) acquired the Fourth 
WGC and Enel (Italy) bought the Fifth WGC, while Fortum (Finland) became the owner of 
the territorial company TGC-10.   
Not all generation companies found new owners and investors. The first WGC was not sold to 
anyone and, as a temporary measure, was transferred to the FSK, the national grid company. 
In other words, the cornerstone principle of the reform, separating transmission from 
generation, was violated, albeit for a short period. Once an owner, the FSK transferred the 
voting right, and subsequently sold the shares, to the InterRAO company. 
From 2008 to 2011, the situation has changed drastically. After a series of mergers and share 
acquisitions through Gazprom and the InterRAO company, the federal government reinforced 
its position as the main stake-holder. InterRAO was initially a small state-owned producer but 
endowed with a monopoly on cross-border electricity trade. The company had a few power 
plants near the state borders of total capacity 1.833 GW. As a result of the acquisitions, 
InterRAO has now significant shares in five generation companies, between 20-40%, so that 
the amount of capacity under its control in proportion to the shares is around 23 GW. As a 
result, the two aforementioned companies together control about 42.6 GW or 25% of the 
installed capacity on the wholesale market. The pre-merger companies had power plants in 
different zones so that competition within one zone seems unaffected, yet the situation may 
change when some of the zones are integrated with each other (see below). 
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In short, Gazprom and particularly InterRAO, being both state-owned companies, are used by 
the government to undo privatisation. The core idea of the reformed market where producers 
would compete against each other is put at risk, if not rejected. 
A thorough study of concentration in the Russian ESI was done by Pittman (2007). The 
author estimated the HHI of the six dispatch zones of the country
27
 at the start of the reform 
given the then-proposed ownership of the power plants. The HHI based on the installed 
capacity in each dispatch zone ranges from 1,318 to 2,460, which indicates moderate 
concentration. The author then aims to show that concentration measured as a cumulative 
share of the largest n power plants in the area differs from season to season by accounting for 
seasonal variation in hydropower capacity (the largest capacity is in the spring, the lowest is 
in the winter) and baseload status of CHP (baseload in the winter and peak in the summer). 
He argues that in winter concentration is higher and competition is worse as fewer power 
plants compete for non baseload demand. In spring, the state-owned hydropower plants have 
larger production capacity and as a results larger market share, which also threatens 
competition. 
Pittman conducted his research when the exact market zoning was not clear yet, so he used 
the technical dispatch zones (the smallest ‘units’ available at the time) and, because the 
dispatch zone are quite large, he did not have to consider import flows. Gore et al. (2012) 
offered an estimate of the HHI in 2008 given the new market zoning and initial ownership 
structure, however they did not account for imports either. For example, a company that has 
power plants in a given zone typically also has plants in the neighbouring zones, and it might 
manipulate imports in order to influence supply and prices in the given zone. We suggest re-
estimating the HHI as of 2011 and including imports in the calculation. Considering all 
possible company-specific imports would complicate the analysis heavily so and shall treat all 
inflows to a given zone (a) as one independent supplier, or (b) if the import share is high 
enough, in pro-rata to the installed capacity of companies from the export zones. More 
precisely, the import is the maximum of total hourly inflows during the year 2011. The results 
are presented below in figure 2 and the detailed calculation can be found in Appendix 2, 
Table 2. 
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The total number of the dispatch zones is seven; the Far East zone was not considered in the study.  
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Figure 2. HHI for free flow zones, import as one supplier and import pro-rata. 
Our calculations show that prior to the merger wave none of the free flow zones have HHI 
sufficiently below 1,500, that is all zones are moderately or highly concentrated. Two lowest 
HHI values are 1,466 in zone 7 ‘Ural’ and 1,606 in zone 24 ‘Centre’. Four other zones have 
HHI between 2,000-2,500. These zones are either big in size and/or with relatively mild 
transmission constraints. The median HHI value is 3,915 and the weighted index is 
2,763.Many small zones have at most one TGC, maybe supplemented by one or two power 
plants of some WGC, and quite strong transmission constraints, so they are highly 
concentrated.  
Correcting for the mergers, the HHI index does not change dramatically. The main reason as 
mentioned above is that the pre-merger companies generally operated in different free flow 
zones. Yet, after the zone integration the issue of imports and cross-zone market power might 
become more sensitive.  
Accounting for imports in proportion to installed capacity of the companies from export zones 
indicates that the concentration might be not so severe. The two zones with HHI above 9,000 
have the index dropped to 6,487 (zone #22) and even to 2,937 (zone # 9). Many other zones 
also have lower HHI by 400…1,500 points (as compared to the one-supplier case). 
While the study by Pittman and our HHI estimates highlight the importance of zoning and 
transmission constraints, evaluating the TCRSI for each station provides further insight into 
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the problem. Stations with TCRSI below one (i.e. those indispensable for meeting local 
demand) are typically located in smaller zones with weak transmission links to the rest of the 
market.  The installed capacity of the station might be relatively small (e.g. as little as 100 
MW) but given the small size of the zone and limited potential for imports, withdrawing such 
a station from the market (for example as the result of an outage) may lead to load shedding. 
Any generation company that has plants in such small zones can potentially exercise market 
power, by declaring the whole plant, or some generation blocks, unavailable. 
There are three clusters of smaller FFZs that appear particularly sensitive to plant outages. 
The first cluster is located in the south of Siberia, the second cluster is in the Ural region and 
the third one is in the south of Russia (the latter two are in the ‘Europe’ price area).  Each of 
the zones has between one and three stations, typically thermal power plants and a CHP, 
sometimes combined with a medium-sized hydropower plant. 
Estimating zone-based HHI and transmission-constrained RSI indicates the need to unlock 
small free-flow zones in order to improve efficiency. Construction of new lines and 
modernisation of network equipment is already a major part of the FSK investment 
programme. The results are promising: from 2013 the System Operator will integrate four 
smaller zones into their respective larger neighbours, and from 2014 there will be further 
integrations of two other small zones, so that the total number of FFZs will be reduced from 
28 to 22.Some of the integration will take place in the south of Russia and will clearly 
improve competition in that area. 
To summarize, the unbundling of RAO EES's monopoly and privatisation of new generation 
companies offered an opportunity to create a pool of competitive owners and ensure 
competition on the market. Subsequent mergers and acquisitions created a moderately 
concentrated industry, where the federal government has the largest stake. Further 
consolidation of the assets would most probably be detrimental to competition. In addition, 
market zoning complicates the situation, but the network reinforcement currently 
implemented by the Federal Grid Company should alleviate the situation in the near future. 
5. Mark-up dynamics 
Having examined long-term prospects for market power, we shall now discuss short-term 
dynamics, in the context of market liberalisation. We will first describe the pricing rules and 
the role of contracts in the Russian electricity industry during and after the reform, then 
present a model to evaluate price-cost mark-ups and assess their dynamics over the course of 
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liberalisation. Our main finding is that mark-ups have reduced as a result of removing tariffs- 
this is quite surprising given that one would normally expect an increase. However, 
examining the mark-up dynamics before and after the liberalisation produces more consistent 
results. 
5.1. Liberalisation and types of contracts 
As part of the reform, the wholesale market for electricity and capacity was completely re-
designed. The final aim was to replace tariff regulation (which proved to be inefficient) with 
free pricing and contracts that would ensure efficient production and consumption (i.e. 
production by the lowest cost generators and consumption by customer with the highest price 
bid).  
Given the size of the industry and the novelty of the trading approach, tariff regulation was 
not removed “overnight” but rather reduced gradually over time. The approach is not unique: 
other countries (e.g. England & Wales) used vesting contracts to ensure smooth transition 
from the regulated industry to the free market.  In Russia, since January 2007 the volumes of 
electricity sold under the tariff have decreased by 10-15 percentage points every six months. 
Consequently, the volume of electricity in the free sector of the market was constantly 
increasing. Since January 2011 the wholesale market is fully liberalised. As for the retail 
market, small commercial customers received an opportunity to freely choose their suppliers, 
whereas households still buy their energy at the regulated prices from the supplier appointed 
by the regional authority.  
Figure 3 depicts the actual shares of the regulated sector (measured as the ratio of volume sold 
under tariffs to the total volume traded) versus the liberalisation schedule. It is interesting to 
observe that the actual share of regulated contracts was in line with the scheduled level in the 
early stages and somewhat above the scheduled level in the later stages. A possible (although 
certainly not the sole) reason for such discrepancy could have been the financial crisis that hit 
the economy in late 2008. The share of the regulated contracts was measured with respect to 
the 2007 production volume, and the respective amount of regulatory sales was fixed for the 
whole period of liberalisation. When the total demand decreased in 2009-10, the share of 
regulated volume (fixed at the 2007 level) increased naturally. 
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Figure 3. Liberalisation of the Russian electricity market: schedule and actual pace. 
Once the market was liberalised, regulated tariffs and contracts did not disappear from the 
market. Russian households still buy electricity at fixed retail prices from appointed suppliers, 
who, in turn, buy electricity on the wholesale market under regulated wholesale tariffs only. 
The practice is imposed by the government in order to eliminate price risk for the appointed 
suppliers. The share of such contracts in 2011 fluctuated around 15%, corresponding to a 
share of household consumption of 12% (cf. 26% in the EU-27).
28
 The rest of the wholesale 
electricity market, including purchases for non-household retail supply, is fully liberalised. 
The free sector of the market consists of free contracts and a centralised power exchange. 
During the transition period the market had contracts for electricity and capacity, as well as 
contracts for electricity only. The joint contract was a popular tool to secure supply in peak 
hours, albeit the gross volume contracted was not very significant. In a peak hour, the 
contracted volume could reach 26% of the total amount traded, while the annual share of such 
contracts was a mere 5%.
29
 With the liberalisation of the capacity market and the introduction 
of long term capacity auctions, joint contracts are no longer in use. Only pure electricity 
contracts remain on the market, but they are not widespread either: a share of the contracted 
volume never exceeds 10% in any one hour. Nonetheless, the annual share of such contracts is 
also 5% which indicates more even use throughout the year. 
                                                          
28
 Source of figures: share of contracts 15% - author’s estimate based on data from the Commercial Operator; 
household share in consumption in Russia 12% - Russian Statistics Service; household share in consumption in 
EU 26% - OECD. 
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 All figures in this paragraph are author’s estimates based on hourly data from the Commercial Operator. 
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The regulated contracts used in the Russian electricity market by nature represent the vesting 
contracts used in other countries to ensure smooth transition from the regulated industry to a 
free market (e.g. in England and Wales). The vesting contracts facilitate the transition but 
since they expire without a requirement for renewal, they help mitigate market power only in 
the short-term. Free contracts do not appear popular on the Russian market, so the issue of 
market power remains unsettled.  
5.2. Estimating benchmark prices and the Lerner index  
To evaluate the role of contracts in market power, we first need to estimate the Lerner index, 
which is a conventional instrument to estimate price-cost mark-up on the electricity market. 
The index is computed as ( ) /LI P MC P  and is evaluated in empirical studies as 
( ) /actual estimate actualLI P MC P  . 
Given that MC is unobservable, we estimate the unit production cost of the marginal plant, 
and hence the equilibrium price, using the linear programming model. In the model, the 
objective function minimise total cost of meeting demand in each hour given installed 
capacity and transmission constraints (full details can be found in the Appendix 1.Model 2).  
Our estimate considers only fuel cost, so an index below 20% is not very informative. Rather, 
it is relative changes in the Lerner index (in particular, spikes or shifts in the trend) that would 
indicate the exercise of market power. 
The model generates equilibrium, or benchmark, prices for all 28 zones. Figure 4 presents the 
Lerner index for the three largest FFZs no. 1, 7 and 24 over two years (smoothed by MA 
28-days filter).The time series appear to be stable, with humps in the summer periods. The 
model estimates the price to be very low during the summer due to small demand, but the 
actual price appears somewhat higher (perhaps due to technical requirements), so the Lerner 
index looks excessive. The summary statistics are given in Appendix 2, Table 2. 
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Figure 4. Mark-ups (MA 28 days), free flow zones 1 ‘Siberia’, 7 ‘Ural’ and 24 ‘Moscow’. 
Fitting the trend to individual LIs produces statistically significant estimates for the time 
coefficient and the intercept for the bulk of the zones (see table 3). Hence, we use ADF testing 
with trends and intercepts to examine the stationarity of the Lerner index (ADF test with 
intercept only for zones without a significant trend slope).All zones have a stationary LI 
within the full sample in each year and half-year
30
. 
We then compare the dynamics of the Lerner index during the two respective years and half-
years. To this end, we define the first difference as ΔLI = LI2010– LI2011and test for the 
presence of a trend and stationarity. The first difference has zero mean value and appears to 
be stationary both within the year and the two half-years. 
Comparing dynamics of LI helps clarify the overall trend but it tells little about the growth of 
LI in relation to the demand growth. In order to compare LI before and after the liberalisation 
at the same level of demand, we plot consumption versus LI for 2010 and 2011. LI at the 
highest levels of demand is of particular interest when the potential for, or the temptation of, 
abusing market power is the strongest.   
When plotting LI versus consumption, the series are sorted by volume of consumption, from 
the lowest to the highest value. Visual inspection of the graphs for each zone gives two types 
of patterns of LI dynamics. Graphically, the two patterns are illustrated on figure 5. The 
horizontal axis is electricity demand (sorted from lowest to highest); the vertical axis is the 
corresponding value of the Lerner index (mark-up) on the top panel and the fuel cost. 
Theoretically, the two patterns are associated with different types of supply curve, with and 
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 For test statistics see the Appendix 2. Table 5. 
23 
 
without must-run generation which translate into different mark-up dynamics (cf. figure 1 in 
section 3).  
 
 
Figure 5. Demand versus mark-up, two patterns. Zones 26 ‘Moscow’ (top) and 12 ‘Vyatka’ (bottom).  
Note. The two zones are chosen for illustration only; all other zones have one of the two patterns. 
One pattern is associated with zones that have no low-cost generation. In these zones the 
equilibrium price is positive in (almost) any hour and is increasing with the level of demand. 
Hence, LI starts from a small value (perhaps from zero) and grows monotonically as the 
demand is approaching the overall capacity limit. 
The other pattern is associated with zones dominated by hydropower or nuclear generation. 
Typically such generation is treated as must run and operates under price-taking bids. In such 
zones the estimated equilibrium price is almost zero at a low level of demand. The price 
becomes positive at a high level of demand when the hydropower stations reach their capacity 
limit and thermal stations come into operation. Consequently, the LI is extremely high when 
demand is small and reflects the price-cost margin when demand is approaching the capacity 
limit. 
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The bulk of zones exhibit the first type of pattern (twenty zones in total).The zones with 
hydropower generation that exhibit the second type of pattern are zones # 1 (in Siberia), zones 
# 13-17 (along the river Volga) and #27-28 (St. Petersburg and northern areas with clusters of 
small hydropower stations). In zone #27 the pattern of LI is driven by the presence of both 
hydro- and nuclear power plants. 
Graphical representation might indicate that LI is relatively high at the peak level of demand, 
yet our model considers fuel cost only, not operation and maintenance expenditure. Assuming 
the latter account for 30% of the total variable cost, LI appears to fluctuate around zero for 
most zones. Comparing the consumption-LI graphs for 2010 and 2011 shows that hourly 
mark-ups did not change significantly as the market was liberalised. For the majority of zones, 
LI does not increase for the same level of demand: the change is within 5 percentage points. 
Thus, we conclude that although HHI and RSI measures indicate the potential for market 
power abuse, hourly LI estimates do not support the hypothesis of actual market power abuse. 
5.3. Lerner index - Tobit regression 
Regulated tariffs can be interpreted as contract sales, wherein both the volume and the price 
are known well in advance. Since the tariffs are below production costs, generators are 
expected to bid above competitive prices in order to receive positive profits. Removing 
regulation reduces the incentive for upward bidding; hence the mark-up is expected to decline 
over time. It is therefore useful to test the level of market power (as measured by the price-
cost mark-up) against contract volumes, for both regulated and free contracts, while 
compensating for other variables (seasonality, weather, etc.). 
Since the variable of interest, in the Lerner index, is limited at least from above, we will use 
the Tobit (or censored data)models. We also bound the index from below (at -1) to exclude 
the outliers which represent less than 1% of the sample.
31
 The estimated equation and the 
summary statistics for the continuous variables are presented below (the full list of variables 
and data sources are given in Appendix 2, Table 4). 
1, * 1
*, 1 * 1
LI
LI
LI LI
  
 
    (2.8)
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 Strictly speaking, the Lerner index in our model has a corner solution at 1 and is censored from below at (-1). 
The model set-up, however, remains the same. See Wooldridge (2002, p. 517-520). 
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Table 1.Summary statistics for the continuous variables. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Lerner index 0.34 0.40 ─1 1 
Share of regulated contracts, % 31.0 19.45 0 67.49 
Share of free contracts, % 8.40 7.33 0 36.27 
Air temperature, degrees °C 4.55 14.31 ─44.8 40.90 
As can be seen from the equation, we use air temperature and the seasonal dummy as proxies 
for energy demand rather than heating/cooling degree days. The main reason is the position of 
CHP power plants in the Russian electricity system which account for half of thermal 
generation and third of the system. CHP plants supply heat centrally to many cities and 
municipalities because households live predominantly in blocks of flats and do not have 
individual boilers. Hence using the variable ‘heating/cooling degree days’ probably does not 
make much sense.  
The seasonal dummy is used not to reflect the winter period per se but to reflect different 
status of CHP plants in winter and summer. During winter CHP plants operate in heat mode 
which is equivalent to base load status. During summer CHP plants operate as pure thermal 
stations and can have flexible load. The change of CHP status affects significantly the amount 
of baseload, or must run, generation and the amount of residual supply, and hence the 
equilibrium prices.  
As a part of sensitivity analysis, we estimate a regression with the interacted variables “air 
temperature” and “winter season”. The results show that the coefficient of the share of free 
contracts change but the marginal effect on reducing market power is still small. However, the 
key coefficient of interest, on the regulated contracts, remains unaffected so is the main 
conclusion on the impact of de-regulation on market power. 
There are two potential problems with the Tobit specification outlined above: construction of 
the dependent variable, and autocorrelation in residuals.  
The use of a constructed dependent variable, such as the Lerner index, requires extra care, 
since it is not observed, but rather constructed from real electricity prices and benchmark 
prices (which, in turn, are equal to estimated marginal cost). While real prices might be 
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treated as a realisation of a random variable, benchmark values are derived from a linear 
programming model and are therefore non-random. Running the model several times with 
different input data (e.g. fuel prices or plant availability) could generate multiple price 
samples and hence a probability distribution. However, Russian fuel markets rely heavily on 
long-term contracts with fixed prices, and the data on outages is not publicly available, so the 
results of the Tobit regression cannot be tested against the non-randomness of the Lerner 
index. 
Potential autocorrelation of the time series or residuals might affect the estimates. First, the 
disturbance term might be an AR(p) process; second, the latent variable might depend on its 
lagged value in the previous hour; and finally, some variables could be omitted from the 
analysis. The AR process reflects the fact that an exogenous shock is persistent over several 
periods (e.g. when a failed transmission line requires time to be repaired, during which a 
generator could otherwise exercise market power). A lagged dependent variable would imply 
that a generator bids upward for several hours, because an isolated high bid in any one hour 
would certainly attract attention. As for omitted variable problems, the most significant is 
probably the reserve margin, which might be difficult to compute for a sub-zone of the market. 
The short-run horizon and the inclusion of hour-type dummies should tackle the problem, to a 
certain extent. 
Bearing this in mind, we still find it useful to run the most simplified Tobit regression in order 
to gain some insight into the liberalisation and market power. 
Our sample contains 28 free flow zones, or units, and 17,520 hours (8760 hours/year 
multiplied by2years) so it is panel data. The total number of observations is 490,532 of which 
a mere 688 are censored at (-1) and almost one fifth (105,838) is a corner value (at +1). The 
appropriate Tobit model for our panel would consider fixed effects. However, we can still use 
a Tobit model for cross-section data with unit dummies, since the number of units is fixed and 
the time horizon is quite large, thus estimates should be both consistent and efficient32.  
                                                          
32
 Typically, censored panel data comes from household surveys (i.e. with a large, and increasing, number of 
units and few annual observations per unit). Using a Tobit cross-section model is not appropriate in this case, as 
the estimates are inconsistent with N→∞ and T fixed (the so-called incidental parameters problem; see Neyman 
and Scott, 1948). Honore (1992) and Alan et al. (2011) developed a non-parametric estimator for use with 
household surveys. Our model is fundamentally different because we have a fixed number of units and an 
expanding horizon, N fixed and T→∞. In such a case, a Tobit cross-section model with unit dummies would 
produce both consistent and efficient estimates and the use of a special Tobit-panel model is not necessary; see 
also Greene (2004). 
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Baseline results for the Tobit regression are given in table 5. Three specifications are 
considered: (i) without the FFZ dummies, (ii) with FFZ dummies and (iii) with FFZ dummies 
and the interaction of hour-type and season variables. The third specification provides a more 
refined response for the latent variable with a combination of hour-type and season, while the 
coefficients of other variables are roughly equal to those in the second specification. The 
discussion below is based on the third model. 
All coefficients appear to be statistically significant and the conventional variables all have 
the correct sign. The temperature coefficients would suggest that a high temperature is more 
likely to aggravate market power, as opposed to extreme values below zero. Heat in the 
summer appears more problematic, despite low demand in general, since many generators 
have scheduled maintenance during this period, hence the available amount of capacity to 
support air conditioning is limited. As for low temperatures, the effect is partially captured by 
the winter dummy variable. 
Since the regression is nonlinear, using the coefficient values for quantifying the impact on 
the dependent variable is not correct; instead, one must use the marginal effects (see the 
Appendix 1. Model 4 for the relevant formula). Computing the marginal effect for the hour 
dummies shows that shoulder and peak hours add 9-10 percentage points (p.p.) to the Lerner 
index. Furthermore, winter adds another10-13 percentage points (p.p.) to the index in any 
hour (off-peak, shoulder or peak). Altogether, this implies significant variation in market 
power between summer off-peak and winter peak hours. 
The key variable of interest, the share of regulated contracts, has a positive coefficient which 
implies that liberalisation (i.e. reduction of the share) has decreased potential for market 
power abuse. In the first half of 2010, the share of regulated contracts was 40% and in the 
second half of the year it was 20%. The marginal effect of the regulated contract is equal to 
0.0352; that is to say that reducing the share of regulated contracts from 40% to zero 
decreased the Lerner index by 1.66 p.p. (0.0415 x 40). The marginal effect of free contracts is 
equal to -0.0279, so that increasing the contract volumes by 10 p.p. would reduce market 
power by only 0.2 p.p. 
Both types of contracts have relatively small marginal effects, but they are statistically 
significant. From the competition perspective, this implies that contracting has limited 
potential for reducing market power in the Russian electricity industry. More emphasis should 
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be placed on other factors, such as reducing concentration or alleviating transmission 
constraints. 
As for the FFZ dummies, only a few of them have positive coefficients; that is to say that they 
are more likely to suffer from market power abuse compared to base zone 24 ‘Centre’ (a large 
free-flow zone located in the European part of Russia). These are zones ## 1, 11, 13, 14 and 
27.Their marginal effect varies from 7 to 22 p.p. As discussed earlier, the Federal Grid 
company enhances the transmission network, and some of these zones - namely 11, 13 and 14 
(which have the highest marginal effects) - will soon be integrated within their larger 
neighbours.  
Note that the share of regulated contracts has a negative coefficient which at first glance 
appears at odds with forward contracting models. Running the regression separately for 2010 
and 2011 indicates that regulated contracts are probably not very different from free contracts. 
In the regression for 2010, both types of contract have negative coefficients which conform to 
the main result of the forward market model (i.e. that contracting reduces market power). 
Moreover, the contracts now have a much larger effect on the Lerner index. When the share 
of the regulated contracts dropped from 40% to zero, the index jumped up by 26.5p.p. As for 
free contracts, increasing their share by 10 p.p. would reduce the Lerner index by nearly 9 p.p. 
By contrast, in 2011 the coefficients of the regulated contract, which are now used only to 
supply households, swap from negative to positive. The marginal effect for regulated 
contracts equals 0.16; removing household tariffs and any associated regulated contracts (15% 
of market volume) would thus decrease the Lerner index by 2.4 p.p. Free contracts have less 
impact on the Lerner index in the liberalised market: increasing their share by 10 p.p. reduces 
the index by 6.5 p.p. 
The results for 2011 suggest that the overall impact of regulated contracts on market power 
might be related to government intervention in household prices. Removal of regulated 
contracts would probably have a modest impact on market power, although it might induce 
more active contracting or even the introduction of compulsory contracts at free prices. 
6. Conclusion  
The Russian electricity supply industry has undergone major transformation in the last decade, 
from a vertically integrated monopoly to a competitive market. The history of the market has 
been reviewed in a few papers but the outcome of the reform has hardly been examined. In 
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this paper we focused on market power, because it proves to be one of the most acute 
problems in competitive electricity markets.  
Our finding is twofold. On one hand, we observe increasing concentration in assets and 
ownership, counterbalanced by grid development and unlocking of smaller market zones. 
From a policy perspective, the government should analyse more carefully new mergers and 
acquisitions, in particular to avoid increase in concentration. The government should clearly 
continue network enhancement and zone integration in order to support competition in the 
market. 
On the other hand, we estimate price-cost mark-ups and find no sign of significant market 
power abuse. As a special part of our study, we also evaluate the role of contracting on the 
wholesale market. We find that the market power index responds in a normal way to 
contracting, yet the regulated contracts for households seem to bias the picture, and more 
generally they are likely to affect market functioning. As such, our result presents further, 
perhaps indirect, evidence of the perverse impact of regulated pricing. Although politically 
difficult, the Russian government should nonetheless seek to remove tariffs from the market. 
We attribute the perceived discrepancy between high concentration and low contracting on 
one side and low mark-ups on the other side to the cost-bidding rule. The requirement to offer 
electricity at production cost appears to be a particular feature of the Russian electricity 
market, a similar rule is found only on the Irish market. The rule ensures that a generator 
recovers the variable cost on the electricity market, while fixed cost is recovered on the 
capacity market. 
A striking difference of the Russian bid-at-cost rule is that the rule is implemented twice: first, 
during the weekly unit commitment (UC) procedure, and second, on the day-ahead (DA) 
market. If a producer submits an extremely high UC bid, he risks being out of the market for a 
whole week. If he submits a moderate UC bid, he can participate in the DA market but the 
DA bids cannot exceed the UC figures (thus the UC bid acts as a self-cap on the spot market). 
Most importantly, the rule is not only announced, it is also enforced. The Federal Anti-
Monopoly Service has already imposed fines on companies suspected of over-bidding. 
Notable cases include MosEnergo company (former TGC-3) that operates in the Moscow area 
and TGC-11 that operates in Omsk region among others. Enforcing the cost-bidding rule 
appears as a sensible and feasible tool to control actual market power abuse and can be 
recommended for use at other electricity markets or jurisdictions.   
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Appendix 1. Models and input data 
Model 1. Transmission-Constrained Residual Supply Index 
,
max F
q t
R
    (2.10)
 
s.t. 
,
, ,k ki ji s i
k k j
q x R D k i    
  (2.11)
 
, ,k k ki ij iq x K k i      (2.12)
 
, { }kij ij
k
x T ij 
   (2.13) 
0,s si ijq x s F       (2.14) 
where FR – transmission-constrained RSI for firm F,  
{1,...,28}i  – index for free flow zones, 
{1,...,139}k  – index for a generation unit, continuous numbering, 
k
iq – output of unit k  located in zone i  for in-zone consumers, 
k
jix – output of unit k  located in zone i for export to zone j , 
iD – demand in zone i , 
k
iK – installed capacity of unit k  located in zone i , 
ijT – transmission constraint from zone i  to zone j , Note that ij jiT T   as the actual 
network topology may results in different limits on the aggregate flows from i to j  
and from j to i . 
s F  – all generating units s that belong to firm F for which TCRSI is computed, 
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Model 2. Estimating benchmark prices 
,
, ,
min ( )k k k ki i ij i
q x
k i j
q c x c
  (2.15)
 
s.t. 
,
,k ki ji i
k k j
q x D i   
 (2.16)
 
, ,k k ki ij iq x K k i     (2.17)
 
, { }kij ij
k
x T ij 
  (2.18)
 
where k
ic  – variable (marginal) production cost of unit  k  located in zone i , 
and the rest of the notation is the same as in model 1. 
The objective function (2.15) minimise total cost of meeting demand (2.16) given installed 
capacity (2.17) and transmission constraints (2.18). The model is solved simultaneously for 
all free flow zones, for each hour (there is no inter-hour adjustment). 
Benchmark, or equilibrium, prices are formally the Lagrange multipliers to the demand 
constraint (2.2). These are used as estimateMC  in calculation of the Lerner index. 
The model has 28 zones and nearly 80 lines, with many loop flows, in particular in the 
European part of Russia. A standard DC loop flow model would be computationally heavy, so 
we use an approximation where transmission capacity is allocated according to financial 
transactions, not physical flows. In other words, our model allows only flows between 
neighbouring zones, i.e. energy can go from zone A to zone B which are connected, but not 
from A to C (which are not connected) via B, their common neighbour. 
A similar model of allocating transmission capacity is used, for example, by the Central 
Allocation Office that manages cross-border electricity trade between the Central European 
countries. Their model ignores domestic production and the loop flows that are associated 
with production and cross-border trade. Another example is Nordpool, commercial operator 
of electricity trade in the Nordic countries that computes a uniform price and manages 
congestion between zones given contractual flows (purchase and sale) and not physical flows. 
The cost of production in the study is limited to fuel cost only (which represent roughly 60-70% 
of the total cost depending on the producer). Although including total cost would affect the 
merit (dispatch) order of the power plants on the market, current market zoning suggest that 
considering fuel cost only would have little impact on the model outcome. 
Companies’ annual reports provide data on thermal efficiency (fuel used per 1 kWh(e) 
produced).The prices of gas and coal are estimated as follows. The coal market is 
oligopolistic, with sales mainly under privately negotiated contracts. Some generation 
companies report the contract price and these prices are used as a proxy for companies where 
direct reports are not available. As gas prices are completely regulated, the current tariffs are 
publicly available from the regulator’s website. 
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The Administrator of the Trade System publishes various data on market parameters of which 
we use data on consumption and transmission flows. 
The model does not consider start-up cost, planned or unplanned outages, restrictions on 
must-run generation or inter-hour adjustment by hydropower stations. It does not include the 
cross-border exports/imports between Russia and the neighbouring countries (which are 
negligible anyway). The main reason is the absence of data on these parameters. 
Sensitivity analysis of the model to sample outage rates, namely 90% availability in the 
winter and 80% in the summer, shows that prices change in FFZs with dominant thermal 
capacity or strong congestion. Figure 6 presents the impact of the outage rate on the Lerner 
index. The top panel corresponds to FFZ 10 which is a small zone with capacity deficit and 
strong congestion and where the change in LI due to outages is quite strong.  Other zones with 
similar pattern are zones 4, 16 and 17.  The correlation between no-outage prices and prices 
that account for outages in such zones can be 0.67. The bottom panel corresponds to FFZ 24 
which is a large zone in the European part of Russia with some spare capacity and where LI 
remains practically the same. The rest of the zones have the second type of pattern (either 
because they have spare capacity or mild transmission constraints). Since the exact parameters 
of outages are not known, obtaining the estimates may present a separate topic for research. 
 
 
Figure 6. The impact of outages on Lerner index. Zone 10 ‘Serovo-Bogoslovskaya’ (top) and zone 24 ‘Centre’ (bottom). 
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Model 3A. Lerner index - Case of monopoly 
Inverse demand function: ( )P P Q such that 0P Q   . 
Production cost is ( )TC q  and marginal cost is ( )MC q TC q    
Profit function:  ( ) ( ) ( )Q P Q Q TC Q    
First order condition (F.O.C.): 0
P
Q P MC
Q Q
 
   
 
 
Re-arranging the F.O.C. as 
1
1
P MC
Q
P Q
 



and dividing both parts by price P  yields: 
1P MC
Q PP
P Q





.  Realising that (absolute) elasticity of demand is
Q P
P Q


 

,  we have 
the formula for the Lerner index:
1P MC
LI
P 

  .  
Hence, monopoly level of market power is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand. 
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Model 3B. Lerner index - Case of oligopoly 
Number of firms is N . 
Each firm has its own production cost ( )i iTC q  and marginal cost ( )i i i iMC q TC q   . 
Inverse demand function: ( )P P Q   where iiQ q  and 0P Q   . 
Firm profit function: ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i iq P Q q TC q   . 
First order condition (F.O.C.): ( ) ( ) 0i i i i
i
P
q P Q MC q
q Q
 
   
 
 
Re-arranging the F.O.C. as i
i
q
P MC
Q
P
 



,and dividing both parts by price P  and also the 
right-hand side by total output Q  yields: i i
P MC q Q
Q PP
P Q





.   
Elasticity of demand is 
Q P
P Q


 

,  firm’s share in total output is ii
q
s
Q
 , so firm’s specific 
Lerner index is i i
i
P MC s
LI
P 

  . Firm’s level of market power as measured by the Lerner 
index is directly proportional to firm’s share on the market. 
 
Industry Lerner index is the weighted average of specific indices: 
i ii
i i
i
P s MC P MC
LI s LI
P P
 
  

  , where MC is the industry weighted average 
marginal cost. 
Alternatively, 
2( )ii
i i
i
s HHI
LI s LI
 
  

 ,  where 2( )iiHHI s  is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, so the industry Lerner index is directly proportional to industry 
concentration as measured by the HHI index. 
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Model 3C. Lerner index and Residual supply index.  
Note: The model is by Swinand et al (2008), pp. 6-8. 
The largest firm maximises its profit facing residual demand which is defined using the 
efficient rationing rule (Tirole, 1987, p. 213). 
Firm’s profit function: 1 1 1 1 1[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]D p q p D p q c      . 
Efficiently rationed demand: 
1 1
1
( ) ( )  
0
D p q if D p q
D
otherwise
 
 

 . 
Residual supply index for the firm: 
1
1( )
q
RSI
D p
  
Where (.)D  – total demand, p – price, q  – total available capacity of all other firms. 
First order condition (F.O.C.): 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
[ ( ) ] 0
D D
p D p q c
p p p
  
    
  
 
Re-arranging the F.O.C: 1
1 1
1
[ ( ) ]D p q
p c
D
p

 



, dividing both parts by 1p  and the right-hand 
side by we obtain: 1 1 1 1
11
1
[ ( ) ] ( )p c D p q D p
pDp
p D
 




. 
Substituting for the 1RSI  and elasticity of demand, and dropping the subscript, we have: 
1 1P MC
RSI
P  

  . 
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Model 4. Tobit regression and derivation of the marginal effects 
A Tobit, or censored-value, regression was first offered by Tobin (1958). In the 
exposition of the model we shall follow Amemiya (1984). The model is postulated as follows: 
* *
*0
*
0 0
, if 
, , 1, ,
, if 
i i
i i i i
i
y y y
y y x i n
y y y
 
 
   

 , 
where  y  –observed value,  
*y  –true, or latent, value, 
0y  –threshold level, 
x  – vector of independent (explanatory) variables, 
  – vector of coefficients to be estimated, 
  – i.i.d. error term drawn from 2(0, )N  . 
Since the observed dependent variable iy  is not linear in ix , running OLS on either 
non-censored observations(i.e. when *
i iy y ) or a full sample would produce biased estimates 
of   (Amemiya 1984, pp. 10-11). 
The likelihood function for the Tobit model is written as: 
0 1
1
1 i i i
x y x
L
 

  
      
     
    
  , 
where   and   are cdf and pdf of standard normal distribution respectively. The first product 
of the likelihood function “deals” with censored values of y , the second product “deals” with 
observed values of y . The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) was proved to be consistent 
and asymptotically normal. As already discuss in footnote on p. 17, pooled Tobit estimates are also 
consistent in case of panel data with N fixed and T→∞ (Greene 2004). 
The marginal effect of independent variable kx  is the partial derivative of the 
conditional expected value of iy  with respect to that variable: 
( | )
k k
E y
ME
x



x
 . 
In a linear model, the marginal effect is simply ˆ kOLS . Since the Tobit model is not 
linear, estimates of   do not provide information on the change in observed dependent 
variable iy  when ix  changes by a small amount. Greene (2005, p. 765) derives a general 
formula for computing marginal effect which can be summarised as follows:
 0
( | ) ˆ i
k kk
x yE y
ME
x



  
   
  
x
. 
Hence, the marginal effect is roughly the ˆ  estimate times the fraction of non-censored 
observations in the sample (ibid, p. 766). 
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Appendix 2. Tables. 
Table 1.Ownership of generation companies, at the end of 2008 and 2011. 
Company Capacity, 
MW 
Main shareholder(s), type of business and 
country for foreign investors 
Share in capital 
as of 
31.12.2008 
 Share in capital 
as of 31.12.2011  
Wholesale generation companies (WGC) 
WGC-1 9,231 RusHydro 
FSK EES (network grid company) 
22.69% 
43.10% 
InterRAO  
Gazprombank as entrusted administrator 
56.02% 
19.00% 
WGC-2 8,695 Gazprom subsidiaries 56.61% [merged with WGC-6, shares are given for  the new 
company] 
Gazprom subsidiaries 
InterRAO 
 
 
57.25% 
5.7% 
WGC-3 8,357 Norilsk Nickel (ore mining producer) 60.66% InterRAO 
Gazprombank as entrusted administrator 
63.93% 
18.00% 
WGC-4 8,630 E.On (energy, Germany) 76% E.On (energy, Germany) 78.31% 
WGC-5 8,773 Enel (energy, Italy) 
EBRD 
Gazprom subsidiaries 
55.86% 
5.12% 
5.27% 
Enel (energy, Italy) 
EBRD 
InterRAO 
56.43% 
5.18% 
26.43% 
WGC-6 9,052 Gazprom subsidiaries  
FSK EES (network grid company) 
42.88% 
9.60% 
[merger with WGC-2]  
Territorial generation companies (TGC) 
TGC-1 6,287.95 Gazprom (gas monopoly) 
Fortum (energy, Finland)  
28.66% 
25.66% 
Gazprom (gas monopoly) 
Fortum (energy, Finland) 
51.79% 
25.66% 
TGC-2 2,576.5 [not reported]  SINTEZ group (holding) 43.82% 
TGC-3 11,953 Gazprom (gas monopoly) 
Moscow government 
53.47% 
21.16% 
Gazprom (gas monopoly) 
Moscow government 
InterRAO 
53.50% 
26.45% 
5.05% 
TGC-4 3,419.8 Onexim Holding  (affiliated with RUSAL 
aluminium producer) 
49.99% Onexim Holding  (affiliated with RUSAL 
aluminium producer) 
49.99% 
TGC-5 2,467.3 Integrated Energy Systems  
Russian Government 
46.12% 
25.09% 
Integrated Energy Systems  
Russian Government 
40.02% 
25.09% 
TGC-6 3,122.5 FSK EES (IES holding as entrusted 
administrator) 
Integrated Energy Systems  
 
19.95% 
18.41% 
InterRAO 
Integrated Energy Systems  
 
26.08% 
60.04% 
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TGC-7 5,850.7 Integrated Energy Systems  69.65% InterRAO 
Integrated Energy Systems 
32.44% 
57.5% 
TGC-8 2,351 LUKOIL (oil producer) 43.93% [The company was divided into several smaller 
producers, keeping LUKOIL as main shareholder, 
and changed its status from joint-stock to limited, 
no public info on shares] 
 
TGC-9 3,309.4 [not reported]  Integrated Energy Systems 
EBRD 
77.34% 
7.88% 
TGC-10 2,785 Fortum (energy, Finland) 92.9% Fortum (energy, Finland) 94.5% 
TGC-11 2,051 InterRAO 29.89% InterRAO 67.53% 
TGC-12 4,500.2 SUEK holding (coal industry) 49.64% SUEK holding and subsidiaries 66.13% 
TGC-13 2,530 SUEK holding (coal industry) 50.002% SUEK holding and subsidiaries 61.2% 
TGC-14 639.4 Russian Railways company 49.25% Russian Railways company 83.62% 
Energo companies (TGC status) 
TatEnergo 11,315 Tatarstan regional government 100% Tatarstan regional government 100% 
BashkirEnergo 4,556 FSK EES (national grid company) 
Sistema (financial corporation) and 
subsidiaries 
21.27% 
48.87% 
InterRAO 
Sistema (financial corporation) 
20.68% 
50.16% 
NovosibirskEnergo 2,522 [not reported]  [not reported]  
IrkutskEnergo 12,897.9 Federal Government 
 
40% 
 
InterRAO 
EvroSibEnergo 
40% 
50.19% 
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Table 2. The HHI index for free flow zones 
The summary table is below, the table with detailed calculations starts on the next page. 
Zones with a low share of imports (8 zones in total): 1, 7, 8, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28. 
Lower HHI when import is accounted for pro-rata (16 zones in total): 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25. 
Higher HHI when import is accounted for pro-rata (2 zones): 4 and 19 (practically the same set 
of suppliers in the given zone and the zones of export). 
 
FFZ 
index 
Total capacity, 
incl. import, MW 
Share 
of import, % 
HHI 
import as one 
supplier 
HHI 
import 
pro-rata 
1 36,624 1.3 2,041 2,041 
2 3,282 25.9 4,230 3,850 
3 2,538 37.8 5,300 4,682 
4 1,235 23.1 3,515 5,065 
5 1,713 28.8 5,000 4,388 
6 2,428 45.6 3,613 2,117 
7 27,337 14.0 1,466 1,466 
8 12,120 6.3 2,707 2,707 
9 705 96.6 9,342 2,937 
10 1,389 58.0 4,817 2,438 
11 3,001 37.1 3,755 2,782 
12 5,153 52.6 3,923 3,063 
13 18,702 25.7 2,420 1,964 
14 4,799 32.3 2,636 2,104 
15 7,231 5.4 3,861 3,861 
16 4,313 51.7 3,907 2,498 
17 5,234 28.2 3,703 3,300 
18 936 48.7 5,003 4,591 
19 5,062 22.3 1,741 3,023 
20 4,737 34.4 3,975 4,379 
21 547 65.6 5,172 3,822 
22 935 100 10,000 6,487 
23 2,276 21.7 6,602 6,688 
24 37,623 13.5 1,606 1,606 
25 1,967 66.2 5,417 2,350 
26 19,434 23.7 4,445 4,987 
27 13,987 15.3 2,418 2,418 
28 3,633 0 5,005 5,005 
Weighted HHI 2,763 2,626 
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Free flow zone, 
number and name 
Company 
Capacity, 
MW 
Share, % HHI 
1 Imports(total) 458 1.3 2 
Siberia TGC-11 471 1.3 2 
  WGC-2 1,250 3.4 12 
  WGC-4 1,500 4.1 17 
  TGC-12 1,837 5 25 
  NovosibirskEnergo 2,522 6.9 47 
  TGC-13 2,530 6.9 48 
  Krasnoyarskaya Hydropower station 6,000 16.4 268 
  RusHydro 7,176 19.6 384 
  IrkutskEnergo 12,880 35.2 1,237 
  Total 36,624 100 2,041 
2 
Yuzhno-Kuzbasskaya Thermal Power 
Station 
554 16.9 285 
Southern Kuzbass Imports(total) 850 25.9 670 
  TGC-12 1,878 57.2 3,274 
  Total (import as one supplier) 3,282 100 4,230 
  Imports (from zone 1) 
  
  
  TGC-11 11 0.34 0.1 
  WGC-2 29 0.90 1 
  WGC-4 35 1.07 1 
  NovosibirskEnergo 59 1.81 3 
  TGC-13 59 1.81 3 
  Krasnoyarskaya Hydropower station 141 4.30 18 
  RusHydro 169 5.14 26 
  IrkutskEnergo 303 9.22 85 
  
Yuzhno-Kuzbasskaya Thermal Power 
Station 
554 16.9 285 
  TGC-12 (import from zone 1) 43 
58.5 3,427 
  TGC-12 (capacity) 1,878 
  Total (import pro-rata) 3,282 100 3,850 
3 Imports(total) 958 37.8 1,425 
Omsk TGC-11 1,580 62.2 3,875 
  Total (import as one supplier) 2,538 100 5,300 
  Imports (from zone 1) 
  
  
  WGC-2 33 1.2 1 
  WGC-4 40 1.4 2 
  TGC-12 49 1.7 3 
  NovosibirskEnergo 67 2.4 6 
  TGC-13 67 2.4 6 
  Krasnoyarskaya Hydropower station 159 5.6 31 
  RusHydro 190 6.7 45 
45 
 
  IrkutskEnergo 341 12.0 145 
  TGC-11 (import from zone 1) 12 
66.7 4,444 
  TGC-11 (capacity) 1,878 
  Total (import pro-rata) 2,836 100 4,682 
4 Imports (total) 286 23.1 535 
Chita WGC-3 430 34.8 1,213 
  TGC-14 519 42 1,767 
  Total (import as one supplier) 1,235 100 3,515 
  WGC-3  (import from zone 5) 258 
55.7 3,102 
  WGC-3  (capacity) 430 
  TGC-14 (import from zone 5) 28 
44.3 1,963 
  TGC-14 (capacity) 519 
  Total (import pro-rata) 1,235 100 5,065 
5 TGC-14 120 7 49 
Buryatiya Imports(total) 492 28.8 827 
  WGC-3 1,100 64.2 4,124 
  Total (import as one supplier) 1,713 100 5,000 
  Imports (from zones 1) 
  
  
  TGC-11 6 0.4 0.1 
  WGC-2 17 1.0 1 
  WGC-4 20 1.2 1 
  TGC-12 24 1.4 2 
  NovosibirskEnergo 33 2.0 4 
  TGC-13 34 2.0 4 
  Krasnoyarskaya Hydropower station 80 4.6 22 
  RusHydro 95 5.6 31 
  IrkutskEnergo 171 10.0 99 
  TGC-14 (import from zone 4) 7 
7.4 55 
  TGC-14 (capacity) 120 
  WGC-3  (import from zone 4) 6 
64.6 4,171 
  WGC-3  (capacity) 1,100 
  Total (import pro-rata) 1,712 100 4,388 
6 Biyskaya CHP 535 22 486 
Altay TGC-12 785 32.3 1,046 
  Imports(total) 1,107 45.6 2,081 
  Total (import as one supplier) 2,428 100 3,613 
  Imports (from zones 1) 
  
  
  TGC-11 14 0.6 0.4 
  WGC-2 38 1.6 2 
  WGC-4 46 1.9 4 
  NovosibirskEnergo 77 3.2 10 
  TGC-13 77 3.2 10 
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  Krasnoyarskaya Hydropower station 184 7.6 57 
  RusHydro 220 9.1 82 
  IrkutskEnergo 394 16.2 264 
  Biyskaya CHP 535 22.0 486 
  TGC-12 (import from zone 1) 56 
34.7 1,201 
  TGC-12 (capacity) 785 
  Total (import pro-rata) 2,427 100 2,117 
7 Kurganskaya CHP 222 0.8 1 
Ural WGC-4 600 2.2 5 
  RosEnergoAtom 600 2.2 5 
  WGC-3 882 3.2 10 
  TGC-7 1,020 3.7 14 
  TGC-10 1,106 4 16 
  TGC-9 1,168 4.3 18 
  WGC-2 2,059 7.5 57 
  Imports (from zones 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13) 3,815 14 195 
  BashkirEnergo 4,556 16.7 278 
  WGC-5 4,982 18.2 332 
  WGC-1 6,327 23.1 536 
  Total 27,337 100 1,466 
8 Imports 761 6.3 39 
Tyumen WGC-1 1,600 13.2 174 
  TGC-10 1,679 13.9 192 
  WGC-2 3,280 27.1 732 
  WGC-4 4,800 39.6 1,569 
  Total 12,120 100 2,707 
9 WGC-1 24 3.4 12 
Northern Tyumen Imports 681 96.6 9,330 
  Total (import as one supplier) 705 100 9,342 
  Imports (from zone 8) 
  
  
  TGC-10 101 14.3 204 
  WGC-2 197 27.9 778 
  WGC-4 288 40.8 1,666 
  WGC-1(import from zone 8) 96 
17.0 289 
  WGC-1(capacity) 24 
  Total (import pro-rata) 705 100 2,937 
10 TGC-9 57 4.1 17 
Serovo- WGC-2 526 37.9 1,434 
Bogoslovskaya Imports 806 58 3,367 
  Total (import as one supplier) 1,389 100 4,817 
  Imports (from zone 7) 
  
  
  Kurganskaya CHP 8 0.5 0.3 
  WGC-4 21 1.5 2 
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  RosEnergoAtom 21 1.5 2 
  WGC-3 30 2.2 5 
  TGC-7 35 2.5 6 
  TGC-10 38 2.7 7 
  BashkirEnergo 156 11.2 126 
  WGC-5 171 12.3 151 
  WGC-1 217 15.6 244 
  TGC-9 (import from zone 7) 40 
7.0 49 
  TGC-9 (capacity) 57 
  WGC-2 (import from zone 7) 71 
42.9 1,845 
  WGC-2 (capacity) 526 
  Total (import pro-rata) 1,389 100 2,438 
11 RusHydro 519 17.3 299 
Perm Imports(total) 1,113 37.1 1,376 
  TGC-9 1,368 45.6 2,080 
  Total (import as one supplier) 3,001 100 3,755 
  Import (from zone 7) 
  
  
  Kurganskaya CHP 10 0.3 0.1 
  WGC-4 26 0.9 1 
  RosEnergoAtom 26 0.9 1 
  WGC-3 38 1.3 2 
  TGC-7 44 1.5 2 
  TGC-10 47 1.6 2 
  WGC-2 88 2.9 9 
  BashkirEnergo 195 6.5 42 
  WGC-5 214 7.1 51 
  WGC-1 271 9.0 82 
  Import (from zone 12) 
  
  
  TGC-5 61 2.0 4 
  TGC-9 (import from zone 7) 50 
47.3 2,234 
  TGC-9 (capacity) 1,368 
  RusHydro (import from zone 12) 44 
18.8 352 
  RusHydro (capacity) 519 
  Total (import pro-rata) 3,000 100 2,782 
12 RusHydro 1,020 19.8 392 
Vyatka TGC-5 1,420 27.6 760 
  Imports(total) 2,713 52.6 2,772 
  Total (import as one supplier) 5,153 100 3,923 
  Import (from zones 7, 11, 13, 14 and 24) 
  
  
  
Urusinkaya Thermal Power Station (import 
from zone 13) 
6 0.2 0.02 
  Kurganskaya CHP (import from zone 7) 8 0.2 0.05 
  InterRAO (import from zone 24) 12 0.3 0.10 
  Mobilnye GTES company (import from zone 12 0.3 0.11 
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24) 
  WGC-4 (import from zones 7 and 24) 44 1.2 1 
  TGC-10 (import from zone 7) 40 1.1 1 
  TGC-2 (import from zone 24) 54 1.4 2 
  TGC-9 (import from zones 7 and 11) 92 2.5 6 
  TGC-6 (import from zones 13 and 24) 113 3.0 9 
  TGC-4 (import from zone 24) 124 3.3 11 
  BashkirEnergo (import from zone 7) 165 4.4 19 
  WGC-2 (import from zones 7 and 24) 181 4.9 24 
  TGC-7 (import from zone 7 and 13) 195 5.2 27 
  WGC-3 (import from zones 7 and 24) 208 5.6 31 
  WGC-1 (import from zone 7) 229 6.1 37 
  TatEnergo (import from zones 13 and 14) 241 6.5 42 
  WGC-5 (import from zones 7 and 24) 269 7.2 52 
  
RosEnergoAtom (import from zones 7 and 
24) 
448 12.0 144 
  
RusHydro (import from zones 11, 13, 14 
and 24) 
235 
33.6 1,130 
  RusHydro (capacity) 1,020 
  TGC-5 (import from zone 14) 38 
39.1 1,525 
  TGC-5 (capacity) 1,420 
  Total (import pro-rata) 3,733 138 3,063 
13 Urusinkaya Thermal Power Station 161 0.9 1 
Volga TGC-6 745 4 16 
  RusHydro 2,776 14.8 220 
  TGC-7 4,372 23.4 546 
  Imports(total) 4,803 25.7 660 
  TatEnergo 5,845 31.3 977 
  Total (import as one supplier) 18,702 100 2,420 
  Imports (from zones 7, 12, 14, 15 and 24) 
  
  
  Kurganskaya CHP (import from zone 7) 16 0.1 0.0 
  InterRAO (import from zone 24) 23 0.1 0.0 
  
Mobilnye GTES company (import from zone 
24) 
24 0.1 0.0 
  TGC-10 (import from zone 7) 77 0.4 0.2 
  WGC-4 (import from zones 7 and 24) 86 0.5 0.2 
  TGC-5 (import from zones 12 and 14) 173 0.9 0.9 
  TGC-2 (import from zone 24) 105 0.6 0.3 
  TGC-9 (import from zone 7) 82 0.4 0.2 
  TGC-4 (import from zone 24) 239 1.3 2 
  BashkirEnergo (import from zone 7) 319 1.7 3 
  WGC-2 (import from zones 7 and 24) 351 1.9 4 
  WGC-3 (import from zones 7 and 24) 404 2.2 5 
  WGC-1 (import from zone 7) 443 2.4 6 
  WGC-5 (import from zones 7 and 24) 522 2.8 8 
  RosEnergoAtom (import from zones 7, 15 1,148 6.1 38 
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and 24) 
  Urusinkaya Thermal Power Station 161 0.9 1 
  TGC-6 (import from zone 24) 167 
4.9 24 
  TGC-6 (capacity) 745 
  
RusHydro (import from zones 12, 14, 15 
and 24) 
391 
16.9 287 
  RusHydro (capacity) 2,776 
  TGC-7 (import from zones 7 and 15) 175 
24.3 591 
  TGC-7 (capacity) 4,372 
  TatEnergo (import from zone 14) 58 
31.6 996 
  TatEnergo (capacity) 5,845 
  Total (import pro-rata) 18,702 100 1,964 
14 TatEnergo 830 17.3 299 
Kinderi TGC-5 1,047 21.8 476 
  RusHydro 1,370 28.5 815 
  Imports(total) 1,552 32.3 1,046 
  Total (import as one supplier) 4,799 100 2,636 
  Import (from zones 12, 13 and 24) 
  
  
  
Urusinkaya Thermal Power Station (import 
from zone 13) 
5 0.1 0 
  InterRAO (import from zone 24) 10 0.2 0 
  
Mobilnye GTES company (import from zone 
24) 
11 0.2 0 
  WGC-4 (import from zone 24) 20 0.4 0 
  TGC-2 (import from zone 24) 47 1.0 1 
  WGC-5 (import from zone 24) 79 1.6 3 
  WGC-2 (import from zone 24) 94 2.0 4 
  TGC-6 (import from zones 13 and 24) 99 2.1 4 
  TGC-4 (import from zone 24) 109 2.3 5 
  TGC-7 (import from zone 13) 139 2.9 8 
  WGC-3 (import from zone 24) 155 3.2 10 
  RosEnergoAtom (import from zone 24) 375 7.8 61 
  TatEnergo (import from zone 13) 186 
21.2 448 
  TatEnergo (capacity) 830 
  TGC-5 (import from zone 12) 45 
22.8 518 
  TGC-5 (capacity) 1,047 
  RusHydro (import from zones 12, 13 , 24) 179 
32.3 1,042 
  RusHydro (capacity) 1,370 
  Total (import pro-rata) 4,799 100 2,104 
15 Imports(total) 392 5.4 29 
Balakovo RusHydro 1,360 18.8 354 
  TGC-7 1,479 20.5 418 
  RosEnergoAtom 4,000 55.3 3,060 
  Total (import as one supplier) 7,231 100 3,861 
16 RusHydro 793 18.4 338 
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Caucasus WGC-5 1,290 29.9 894 
  Imports(total) 2,231 51.7 2,674 
  Total (import as one supplier) 4,313 100 3,907 
  Import (from zones 19, 20, 21 and 23) 
  
  
  InterRAO (import from zone 21) 39 0.9 1 
  RosEnergoAtom (import from zone 19) 248 5.7 33 
  TGC-8 (import from zones 19, 20 and 21) 385 8.9 80 
  WGC-2 (import from zones 19 and 20) 1,118 25.9 671 
  WGC-5 1,290 29.9 894 
  RusHydro (import from zones 23) 441 
28.6 819 
  RusHydro (capacity) 793 
  Total (import pro-rata) 4,314 100 2,498 
17 TGC-8 1,205 23 530 
Volgograd Imports(total) 1,478 28.2 797 
  RusHydro 2,551 48.7 2,376 
  Total (import as one supplier) 5,234 100 3,703 
  Import (from zones 15, 18, 19 and 24) 
  
  
  InterRAO (import from zone 24) 11 0.2 0.04 
  Mobilnye GTES company (import from z.24) 11 0.2 0.05 
  WGC-4 (import from zone 24) 21 0.4 0.17 
  TGC-7 (import from zone 15) 50 1.0 1 
  TGC-2 (import from zone 24) 50 1.0 1 
  TGC-6 (import from zone 24) 80 1.5 2 
  WGC-5 (import from zone 24) 84 1.6 3 
  TGC-4 (import from zone 24) 115 2.2 5 
  WGC-3 (import from zone 24) 165 3.1 10 
  WGC-2 (import from zones 19 and 24) 171 3.3 11 
  
RosEnergoAtom (import from zones 15, 19 
and 24) 
567 10.8 117 
  TGC-8 (import from zones 18 and 19) 44 
23.9 569 
  TGC-8 1,205 
  RusHydro (import from zones 15 and 24) 108 
50.8 2,581 
  RusHydro 2,551 
  Total (import pro-rata) 5,234 100 3,300 
18 Imports (total) 456 48.7 2,373 
Kaspiy TGC-8 480 51.3 2,630 
  Total (import as one supplier) 936 100 5,003 
  Import (from zones 17 and 19) 
  
  
  RusHydro (import from zone 17) 151 16.2 261 
  RosEnergoAtom (import from zone 19) 59 6.3 40 
  WGC-2 (import from zone 19) 125 13.4 179 
  TGC-8 (import from zones 17 and 19) 120 
64.1 4,110 
  TGC-8 (capacity) 480 
  Total (import pro-rata) 936 100 4,591 
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19 TGC-8 819 16.2 262 
Rostov RosEnergoAtom 1,000 19.8 390 
  Imports(total) 1,131 22.3 499 
  WGC-2 2,112 41.7 1,741 
  Total (import as one supplier) 5,062 100 2,892 
  Import (from zones 16, 17, 18, 20 and 23) 
  
  
  WGC-5 (import from zone 16) 130 2.4 6 
  RusHydro (import from zones 16, 17, 23) 517 9.7 94 
  RosEnergoAtom (capacity) 1,000 18.7 351 
  TGC-8 (import from zones 17, 18 and 20) 517 
25.0 627 
  TGC-8 (capacity) 819 
  WGC-2 (import from zone 20) 242 
44.1 1,945 
  WGC-2 (capacity) 2,112 
  Total (import pro-rata) 5,338 100 3,023 
20 TGC-8 706 14.9 222 
Kuban’ Imports 1,632 34.4 1,186 
  WGC-2 2,400 50.7 2,567 
  Total (import as one supplier) 4,737 100 3,975 
  Import (from zones 16, 19 and 21) 
  
  
  InterRAO (import from zone 21) 42 0.9 1 
  RusHydro (import from zone 16) 209 4.4 19 
  RosEnergoAtom (import from zone 19) 263 5.6 31 
  WGC-5 (import from zone 16) 339 7.2 51 
  TGC-8 (import from zones 19 and 21) 223 
19.6 385 
  TGC-8 (capacity) 706 
  WGC-2 (imports from zone 19) 556 
62.4 3,892 
  WGC-2 (capacity) 2,400 
  Total (import pro-rata) 4,738 100 4,379 
21 TGC-8 30 5.5 30 
Sochi InterRAO 158 28.9 834 
  Imports(total) 359 65.6 4,308 
  Total (import as one supplier) 547 100 5,172 
  Import (from zone 20) 
  
  
  WGC-2 277 50.7 2,572 
  TGC-8 (import from zone 20) 82 
20.4 416 
  TGC-8 (capacity) 30 
  InterRAO 158 28.9 834 
  Total (import pro-rata) 547 100 3,822 
22 Imports (total) 935 100 10,000 
Gelendzhik Total (import as one supplier) 935 100 10,000 
  Import (from zone 20) 
  
  
  TGC-8 213 22.7 517 
  WGC-2 722 77.3 5,971 
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  Total (import pro-rata) 935 100 6,487 
23 Imports 494 21.7 471 
Derbent RusHydro 1,782 78.3 6,132 
  Total (import as one supplier) 2,276 100 6,602 
  Import (from zones 16 and 19) 
  
  
  TGC-8 (import from zone 19) 67 3.0 9 
  WGC-5 (import from zone 16) 106 4.7 22 
  WGC-2 (import from zone 19) 173 7.6 58 
  RosEnergoAtom (import from zone 19) 82 3.6 13 
  RusHydro (import from zone 16) 65 
81.2 6,586 
  RusHydro (capacity) 1,782 
  Total (import pro-rata) 2,276 100 6,688 
24 InterRAO 325 0.9 1 
Centre Mobilnye GTES company 338 0.9 1 
  WGC-4 630 1.7 3 
  TGC-2 1,494 4 16 
  RusHydro 1,840 4.9 24 
  TGC-6 2,378 6.3 40 
  WGC-5 2,475 6.6 43 
  WGC-2 2,960 7.9 62 
  TGC-4 3,420 9.1 83 
  WGC-3 4,885 13 169 
  
Imports(from zones 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 25, 
26, 27) 
5,079 13.5 182 
  RosEnergoAtom 11,800 31.4 984 
  Total (import as one supplier) 37,623 100 1,606 
25 TGC-2 34 1.7 3 
Vologda WGC-2 630 32 1,025 
  Imports(total) 1,303 66.2 4,389 
  Total (import as one supplier) 1,967 100 5,417 
  Import (from zones 24 and 27) 
  
  
  
Mobilnye GTES company (import from zone 
24) 
10 0.5 0.3 
  WGC-4 (import from zone 24) 18 0.9 1 
  InterRAO (from zones 24 and 27) 36 1.8 3 
  RusHydro (import from zone 24) 54 2.7 8 
  TGC-6 (import from zone 24) 70 3.5 13 
  WGC-5 (import from zone 24) 73 3.7 14 
  TGC-4 (import from zone 24) 100 5.1 26 
  TGC-1 (import from zone 27) 130 6.6 43 
  WGC-3 (import from zone 24) 143 7.3 53 
  
RosEnergoAtom (import from zones 24 and 
27) 
464 23.6 556 
  TGC-2 (import from zone 24) 44 
4.0 16 
  TGC-2 (capacity) 34 
53 
 
  WGC-2 (import from zones 24 and 27) 161 
40.2 1,618 
  WGC-2 (capacity) 630 
  Total (import pro-rata) 1,967 100 2,350 
26 MOEK company 191 1 1 
Moscow WGC-4 1,100 5.7 32 
  WGC-1 1,580 8.1 66 
  Imports 4,610 23.7 563 
  TGC-3 11,953 61.5 3,783 
  Total (import as one supplier) 19,434 100 4,445 
  Import (from zones 24 and 27) 
  
  
  
Mobilnye GTES company (import from zone 
24) 
35 0.2 0.03 
  InterRAO (from zones 24 and 27) 127 0.7 0.43 
  TGC-2 (import from zone 24) 155 0.8 1 
  RusHydro (import from zone 24) 191 1.0 1 
  TGC-6 (import from zone 24) 247 1.3 2 
  WGC-5 (import from zone 24) 257 1.3 2 
  TGC-4 (import from zone 24) 355 1.8 3 
  TGC-1 (import from zone 27) 459 2.4 6 
  WGC-3 (import from zone 24) 507 2.6 7 
  WGC-2 (import from zones 24 and 27) 570 2.9 9 
  
RosEnergoAtom (import from zones 24 and 
27) 
1,641 8.4 71 
  MOEK company 191 1.0 1 
  WGC-4 (import from zone 24) 65 
6.0 36 
  WGC-4 (capacity) 1,100 
  WGC-1 1,580 
69.6 4,849 
  TGC-3 11,953 
  Total (import pro-rata) 19,434 100 4,987 
27 InterRAO 900 6.4 41 
West Imports(from zones 24, 25, 26 and 28) 2,142 15.3 235 
  WGC-2 2,530 18.1 328 
  RosEnergoAtom 4,000 28.6 818 
  TGC-1 4,415 31.6 996 
  Total 13,987 100 2,418 
28 RosEnergoAtom 1,760 48.4 2,347 
Kol’skaya TGC-1 1,873 51.6 2,658 
  Total 3,633 100 5,005 
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Table 3. Mean value of Lerner index by zones. 
Free flow 
zone 
Lerner index, % Delta in mean values, 
2010 2011LI LI , p.p. 
(positive value = decrease in 
market power index over time) 
2010 2011 
1 46 44 2 
2 21 23 -2 
3 19 15 4 
4 -20 -20 0 
5 -21 -19 -2 
6 6 -8 14 
7 21 21 0 
8 34 28 6 
9 17 7 10 
10 14 11 3 
11 62 50 12 
12 29 29 0 
13 64 63 1 
14 66 59 7 
15 100 100 0 
16 38 29 9 
17 95 97 -2 
18 26 24 2 
19 12 10 2 
20 17 16 0 
21 19 18 1 
22 22 19 3 
23 100 100 0 
24 38 35 3 
25 11 8 3 
26 30 28 2 
27 53 46 7 
28 99 100 -1 
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Table 4. Fitting hourly trend (two-year sample) 
FFZ Intercept Slope * 10^6 
1 0.42 3.56 
2 0.19 3.76 
3 0.19 -2.30 
4 -0.23 4.35 
5 -0.25 5.76 
6 0.09 -10.99 
7 0.21 -0.59 
8 0.37 -7.14 
9 0.22 -11.26 
10 0.12 0.17 
11 0.63 -8.38 
12 0.29 0.12 
13 0.61 2.70 
14 0.65 -2.90 
15 1.00 -0.18 
16 0.41 -9.08 
17 0.94 1.94 
18 0.25 0.19 
19 0.14 -3.32 
20 0.19 -2.27 
21 0.21 -2.48 
22 0.25 -5.23 
23 1.00 -0.43 
24 0.40 -3.93 
25 0.11 -1.78 
26 0.31 -2.05 
27 0.54 -4.30 
28 0.99 0.25 
 
Note: trend coefficient is not significant for zones 10 and 18, so the DF test for these two zones 
is performed with intercept and no trend (see the following table 5). 
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Table 5. Unit root test statistics. 
Reported are t-statistics for the Dickey-Fuller test. For all zones and all periods the DT test 
rejects the unit root hypothesis at 1%. 
The time frame is the full sample, 2 one-year samples and 4 half-year samples. The one-year 
periods correspond to a year preceding and a year following the market liberalisation. The half 
years in 2010 correspond to the liberalisation schedule (regulated sector 50% from January 2010 
and 20% from July 2010), the half years in 2011 are given for comparison.  
 (1) All zones except no. 10 and 18, model with a constant and trend: 0 1 1t t ty a a t y       
Null hypothesis: 0   against Alternative: 0   
For the sample size of 100, the critical value at 1% is (-4.04). 
(2) FFZ number 10 and 18, model with a constant but without a trend, 0 1t t ty a y      
Null hypothesis: 0   against Alternative: 0   
For the sample size of 100, the critical value at 1% is (-3.51). 
FFZ All sample One year Half-year 
  2010 2011 Jan-June 
2010 
Jul-Dec 
2010 
Jan-Jun 
2011 
Jul-Dec 
2011 
1 -46 -33 -27 -27 -27 -21 -23 
2 -32 -23 -21 -15 -17 -15 -15 
3 -40 -23 -30 -17 -17 -18 -26 
4 -29 -19 -20 -16 -13 -13 -16 
5 -36 -21 -28 -19 -14 -18 -21 
6 -40 -26 -27 -17 -20 -18 -21 
7 -28 -16 -17 -12 -13 -11 -14 
8 -28 -17 -20 -13 -15 -14 -15 
9 -26 -16 -18 -12 -12 -12 -13 
10 -30 -14 -21 -16 -7 -17 -14 
11 -58 -39 -38 -37 -41 -36 -36 
12 -75 -41 -41 -30 -37 -29 -34 
13 -62 -42 -38 -41 -41 -35 -37 
14 -36 -21 -21 -22 -22 -21 -22 
15 -111 -94 -78 -66 -66 -143 -56 
16 -54 -34 -37 -28 -26 -25 -29 
17 -70 -45 -46 -34 -30 -33 -34 
18 -26 -12 -17 -10 -8 -9 -15 
19 -40 -23 -26 -17 -17 -16 -20 
20 -48 -26 -31 -18 -22 -18 -24 
21 -47 -27 -30 -22 -20 -17 -23 
22 -41 -24 -27 -17 -19 -15 -20 
23 -92 -76 -51 -47 -67 -30 -37 
24 -56 -41 -40 -36 -37 -33 -36 
25 -39 -24 -29 -15 -20 -16 -23 
26 -38 -20 -26 -17 -14 -16 -20 
27 -38 -20 -28 -21 -21 -22 -31 
28 -80 -48 -81 -36 -34 -47 -59 
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Table 6. Explanatory variables of the Tobit regression 
Variable Dummy/ 
Continuous 
Dummy values/ Units Comments Source 
Share of regulated 
contracts 
Continuous  Per cent Ratio of regulated contract for electricity sale in the price 
zone relative to the total sales (there is no data for FFZ) 
Commercial Operator, 
author’s calculations 
Share of free 
contracts 
Continuous  Per cent Ratio of free contracts for electricity sale in the price zone 
relative to the total sales (there is no data for FFZ) 
Commercial Operator, 
author’s calculations 
Hour type 
 
Dummy 
 
Off-peak (base), shoulder and 
peak hour. 
Precise hour type is defined by the System Operator 
(depends on daylight timing and day of the week/public 
holiday) 
System Operator 
Season Dummy Summer (base): from April 1
st
 
to September 30  
Winter: from October 1
st
 to 
March 31
st
 
Captures the use of central heating systems (CHP plants 
in heat mode during winter and in thermal mode during 
summer) 
 
Air temperature  Continuous Degree centigrade Captures the demand fluctuation. 
1) Actual time series have 3-hour frequency, (at 0, 3, 6 
etc. hours). Values for hours 1 and 2 are set the same as 
for hour 0; for hours 4 and 5 – same as for hour 3, etc. 
2) Actual time series are available for cities/towns; we 
consider cities which are centres of administrative 
regions. When an FFZ consists of several administrative 
regions, the temperature series of the cities are weighted 
by population in the given region.* 
Temperature: 
Weather online archive 
of SMIS Lab, Russian 
Academy of Sciences** 
 
Population:  
Russian Federal Statistics 
Service 
Air temperature 
squared 
Continuous Degree centigrade squared Captures the impact of extreme values  
FFZ index Dummy Index 1…28; 
Base is FFZ #24 ‘Centre’ (in 
the European part of Russia) 
Captures fixed effects including local climate, generation 
mix and transmission constraints. 
 
 
* Method for estimating air temperature variable using actual values and people’s population as weights was used in Bask et al. (2011) 
** SMIS Lab – Space Monitoring Information Support Laboratory, Space Research Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences. 
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Table 7. Tobit regressions – difference specifications. 
(1) Hour and season dummies separately, no FFZ index 
(2) Hour and season dummies separately, with FFZ index 
(3) Hour type and season – interaction, with FFZ index 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect 
Share of regulated contracts -0.032 0.055 0.052 0.0415 
Share of free contracts -1.952 -0.015(*) -0.035 -0.0279 
Shoulder hour 5.361 7.628 
 
 
Peak hour 5.284 7.535 
 
 
Winter 5.315 7.802 
 
 
Off peak hour * winter 
  
16.539 10.470 
Shoulder hour * summer 
  
12.053 9.260 
Shoulder hour * winter 
  
20.241 12.847 
Peak hour * summer 
  
13.429 10.439 
Peak hour * winter 
  
19.238 11.382 
Air temp 0.549 0.190 0.215 0.172 
(Air temp)
2 -0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 
FFZ dummies no yes yes 
Constant 50.916 24.712 22.113 17.637 
Sigma (std deviation of residuals) 45.469 24.944 24.878 
Log likelihood -2,130,947 -1,834,130 -1,832,201 
Pseudo R2 0.0156 0.1528 0.1536 
(*) Not statistically significant even at 10% 
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Table 8. Tobit regression for years 2010 and 2011  
Third specification from table 7. 
  
2010 2011 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect 
Share of regulated contracts -0.685 -0.662 0.167 0.160 
Share of free contracts -0.915 -0.883 -0.681 -0.653 
Off peak hour * winter 10.708 10.332 19.234 18.458 
Shoulder hour * summer 10.022 9.670 13.579 13.031 
Shoulder hour * winter 15.177 14.644 22.933 22.007 
Peak hour * summer 11.570 11.164 14.448 13.864 
Peak hour * winter 12.668 12.232 21.188 20.333 
Air temp 0.296 0.284 0.062 0.060 
(Air temp)
2
 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 
FFZ dummies yes yes 
Constant 60.582 58.454 21.534 20.665 
Sigma (std deviation of error term) 24.374 24.563 
Log likelihood -907,126 -919,199 
Pseudo R2 0.1562 0.1563 
 
 
